Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 by Yorio, Edward
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 4 Article 1 
1987 
Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Edward Yorio 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 395 (1987). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol55/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Cover Page Footnote 
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1968, Columbia University; J.D. 1971, Harvard 
University. I wish to express my gratitude to David S. Evans of the Economics Department of Fordham 
University for reading and astutely commenting on a portion of this Article. The research and writing of 
this Article were supported by a research grant from Fordham University School of Law, for which I am 
very grateful. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol55/iss4/1 




0 N October 22, 1986, President Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 ("the 1986 Act"),' the final stage in a long and arduous
administrative and legislative battle to revise the rules of federal income
taxation.2 Because there are signs that this may not be the end of the war
between the proponents and opponents of tax revision,' it is appropriate
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1968, Columbia Uni-
versity; J.D. 1971, Harvard University. I wish to express my gratitude to David S. Evans
of the Economics Department of Fordham University for reading and astutely comment-
ing on a portion of this Article. The research and writing of this Article were supported
by a research grant from Fordham University School of Law, for which I am very
grateful.
1. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 1.
2. In his 1984 State of the Union Address, President Reagan requested that the
Treasury Department prepare a report on the federal tax system. See President Reagan's
1984 State of the Union Address, 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 87, 90 (Jan. 25, 1984).
Shortly after the 1984 elections, the Treasury Department submitted its report. See De-
partment of the Treasury, The Treasury Department Report to the President: Tax Re-
form for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Treasury
Report]. On May 29, 1985, the President sent Congress his proposals for tax revision.
See The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity
(May 29, 1985) [hereinafter President's Proposals].
The road through Congress was tortuous. On Dec. 11, 1985, the President lost a key
procedural vote on the floor of the House of Representatives that appeared to doom tax
revision. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 4. To save the bill, President Reagan
made a personal appeal to wavering representatives. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1985, at
Al, col. 6. In response, the House reversed itself, passing a bill less than a week after the
procedural defeat. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The deliberations in the
Senate Finance Committee, in which provisions to retain many tax preferences were ap-
proved, threatened to undermine, if not doom, the movement for tax reform. See N.Y.
Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at D1, col. 1. But in response to the efforts of Senator Packwood,
the Committee Chairman, the Finance Committee ultimately approved proposals for
sweeping tax revisions. See N.Y. Times, May 7, 1986, at Al, col. 1. The bill passed the
full Senate within two months. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1986, at Al, col. 6. After
extensive deliberations, conferees from the House and Senate approved the tax bill. See
N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1986, at Al, col. 6. The bill passed the full House on Sept. 25,
1986. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1986, at Al, col. 6. Two days later, the bill passed the
Senate. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, at Al, col. 6. The bill became law when signed
by the President on Oct. 22, 1986. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1986, at DI, col. 6.
3. Proposals for further changes in the federal tax system are legion. Shortly before
the tax bill passed Congress, Rep. Rostenkowski, the Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, suggested that tax rates might be raised to reduce the deficit. See N.Y.
Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at D2, col. 4; id., Sept. 6, 1986, at DI, col. 1. The Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Rep. Jim Wright, has suggested that marginal tax rates might
not be reduced in accordance with the provisions of the 1986 Act. See N.Y. Times, Dec.
9, 1986, at Al, col. 1. To raise additional revenue, Senator Packwood has suggested in-
stead that Congress "abolish more deductions and other tax preferences." See N.Y.
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to assess now what was achieved by the 1986 Act and what, if anything,
remains to be done. Many of my general views on federal tax policy were
previously presented in an article that appeared in this law review.4 At
that time, I commented on the President's proposals to Congress for tax
reform, offering a generally positive assessment of the program from the
perspectives of equity and efficiency. 5 Subsequently, two law review arti-
cles were published that endorsed different standards for determining the
equity or efficiency of a federal income tax provision, which, if valid,
would place in doubt some of my conclusions regarding the tax prefer-
ences found in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ("the pre-1986
Code"). 6
The purpose of this Article is to consider the merits of these different
standards and, in light of this analysis, to judge the success of the 1986
Act in promoting equity and efficiency. Part I analyzes and compares
the standards set out in these articles to the tax policy criteria and the
specific recommendations for reform contained in my previous article.
Part II presents a brief overview of the major features of the 1986 Act.
Drawing on the analysis in my previous article and in Part I of this Arti-
cle, Part III evaluates the 1986 Act as it affects individual income taxpay-
ers. Part IV discusses some of the major deficiencies remaining after the
1986 Act and makes a number of recommendations for reform of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("the Code").
I. STANDARDS OF EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
A. Equity
My earlier article surveyed various methods by which taxpayers could
reduce or avoid taxes on income from capital prior to the passage of the
1986 Act.7 Without pretending to exhaust the list of possible avoidance
devices, the article identified five primary sources of tax avoidance on
income from capital: the exclusion of certain forms of income (such as
interest on state and local government bonds);' the creation of artificial
entities (such as trusts) to shift income from higher- to lower-bracket
Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at D2, col. 4. A number of Congressmen have endorsed a value-
added or consumption-type tax as a supplement to the income tax. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1986, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (article by Sen. Roth); Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 26, col.
4 (article by Rep. N. Gingrich); see also Hanlon, Stage Set for Next Year's Battle Over
Using Tax Reform Bill to Raise Revenue, 33 Tax Notes 134 (1986) (discussion of various
revenue options available to Congress).
4. See Yorio, The President's Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the Right Direction, 53
Fordhamn L. Rev. 1255 (1985) [hereinafter Yorio I].
5. See id. at 1265-88.
6. See Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income Tax
Avoidance, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 657 (1985); Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 973 (1986).
7. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1270-74, 1282-88.
8. See id at 1270-73.
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taxpayers;9 the deferral of income through accelerated deductions or
credits (such as those permitted by the Accelerated Cost Recovery Sys-
tem ("ACRS"));1° the deductibility of 60% of an individual taxpayer's
long-term capital gains;" and the use of leveraging by which a taxpayer
borrows to invest in a tax-favored activity and deducts the interest to
offset other sources of income.12 The article also noted that the last three
of these avoidance devices, which permit deferral, rate conversion, and
leveraging, constitute the major ingredients of the typical tax shelter.' 3
The article condemned these tax avoidance techniques on the grounds
that each violates what was labeled the "equality criterion" of federal tax
policy, 4 which requires that income be taxed at approximately the same
rate for taxpayers with the same amount of income.' 5 In an incisive arti-
cle on tax avoidance that appeared subsequent to the writing of my arti-
cle, George Cooper distinguishes among the various devices for reducing
taxation on income from capital' 6 and concludes that not all of these
devices are offensive from the standpoint of tax equity. 7 If this conclu-
sion is valid, it suggests that my criticism of some of the devices listed
above may have been unfounded.
1. Implicit Tax and the Market Pricing Mechanism
The concept of an "implicit tax" plays a central role in Cooper's analy-
9. See id. at 1282-83.
10. See id at 1286-87.
11. See id. at 1283-86.
12. See id at 1286.
13. See id
14. See 1d. at 1270-88.
15. See id at 1257.
16. See Cooper, supra note 6.
17. See id at 707-14.
Cooper's analysis of the equity issue follows an informative historical survey in which
he demonstrates that virtually all of the tax minimization techniques at issue in the recent
debates on tax reform have been with us in somewhat disguised form from the inception
of the income tax. See id at 663-67. He also establishes that congressional attempts to
outlaw tax avoidance have lasted nearly as long and have proven to be generally unsuc-
cessful in preventing taxpayers from exploiting opportunities to reduce taxes. See id. at
663-67, 702-05. Cooper's clear and detailed explanation of the mechanics and tax advan-
tages of the modern tax shelter (deferral, rate conversion, and leveraging) serves as a
particularly graphic illustration of Congress's repeated failure (at least prior to the 1986
Act) to overcome this problem. See id. at 667-94. He demonstrates, moreover, that these
attempts failed because Congress never developed clear guidelines for identifying unac-
ceptable methods of tax avoidance. See id. at 693-94, 721. Rather, Congress dealt with
the problem on an ad hoe basis, responding generally to particular instances of abuse that
shocked its conscience or that of the public. See id. at 660, 718-21. This piecemeal ap-
proach was bound to fail, not only because it ignored the underlying problem, but also
because it tolerated the simultaneous enactment of other Code provisions that opened the
door to further, albeit generally different, forms of tax avoidance. See id. at 679, 691.
Against this background of history and analysis, Cooper sets out a unified and consistent
perspective on tax avoidance with the primary goal of providing guidelines for distin-
guishing between tax devices that represent unacceptable avoidance and devices that are
relatively benign. See id. at 694-718.
1987]
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sis of tax avoidance from an equity perspective. 18 Taxpayers who invest
in tax-favored capital sometimes pay a price for the tax advantages in the
form of reduced economic returns on their investments. Tax-exempt
state and local government bonds provide perhaps the clearest illustra-
tion of this phenomenon. It is generally acknowledged that the rate of
return on these bonds is lower than the rate of return on comparable,
fully-taxable investments of equivalent risk.19 To the extent of the differ-
ence between those rates of return, the investor is in effect paying an
"implicit tax."' 0 To the governmental entity issuing the bonds, that dif-
ference represents the tax subsidy afforded by virtue of the federal tax
exemption.21 If, for example, the interest rate on a municipal bond is 7%
and the rate on a fully-taxable bond is 10%, the investor is paying an
implicit tax of 3% of the principal and the issuing government is receiv-
ing a subsidy in the same amount.
The existence of an implicit tax on many tax-favored investments de-
rives from a simple principle of economics. When an investment is sub-
ject to favorable tax treatment, demand for it increases and the price of
the investment rises accordingly.22 As a consequence of this market pric-
ing mechanism, the rate of return on the tax-favored investment declines,
resulting in an implicit tax. 2
3
The implications of this phenomenon from the standpoint of tax equity
are significant. To the extent that the market imposes an implicit tax on
an investment favored by the Code, it reduces the difference in the after-
tax rate of return between the investment and a fully-taxable investment,
thereby mitigating tax inequity.24 Moreover, if the implicit tax equals
the actual tax on a fully-taxable investment, the market pricing mecha-
nism would have the effect of eliminating any inequity.25
According to Cooper, not all tax advantages provided by the pre-1986
18. See id. at 698-701. The possibility that an "implicit tax" may mitigate tax ineq-
uity has been noted previously by other commentators. See, e.g., Bittker, Equity, Effi-
ciency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, 16 San Diego L.
Rev. 735, 738 (1979); Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget
Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 679, 702-06 (1976); see also Yorio I,
supra note 4, at 1259 (no tax inequity if the rate of return on tax-favored investments is
no greater than the after-tax return on fully taxable bonds).
19. See, e.g., Bailey, Progressivity and Investment Yields Under U.S. Income Taxation,
82 J. Pol. Econ. 1157, 1159-60 (1974); Galper & Zimmerman, Preferential Taxation and
Portfolio Choice: Some Empirical Evidence, 30 Nat'l Tax J. 387, 388-89 (1977).
20. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 698-99.
21. See Ackerman & Ott, An Analysis of the Revenue Effects of Proposed Substitutes
for Tax Exemption of State and Local Bonds, 23 Nat'l Tax J. 397, 397-400 (1970).
22. See Galper & Zimmerman, supra note 19, at 396.
23. See id. at 388.
24. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 700-01.
25. With respect to a newly-enacted tax preference, the first investors who pursue the
preference will gain a tax advantage. See Bittker, Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalization or
Does the Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, 28 Nat'l Tax J. 416, 417 (1975). But the conse-
quent inequity may last only until the market pricing mechanism operates to raise the
price of the tax-preferred investment. See id.
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Code were subject to mitigation by the market pricing mechanism.26
Since the supply of artificial entities (such as trusts) for the purposes of
tax avoidance is virtually limitless, an increase in demand for these enti-
ties caused by tax motives generally will not affect the rate of return or
result in an implicit tax.27 Moreover, since constraints on the internal
leveraging of real estate tax shelters are minimal, the market finds it diffi-
cult to capitalize the tax benefits of those shelters.28 Consequently, the
rate of return received by an investor will be reduced minimally, if at all,
by an implicit tax.
Cooper draws a fundamental distinction between tax avoidance de-
vices that are subject to the market pricing mechanism and those that are
not.29 Because the latter do not contain an implicit tax, they are the most
serious sources of tax inequity.3" Opponents of tax avoidance are thus
enjoined to concentrate their efforts on these "real equity problems," and
to accept the "market pricing mechanism" as "a powerful weapon elimi-
nating the equity effects of most [other] avoidance efforts."'" Consistent
with this analysis, Cooper makes a number of intriguing proposals for
eliminating the tax benefits of avoidance devices not subject to the mar-
ket pricing mechanism.32
The potential significance of Cooper's analysis, if correct,33 is hard to
overstate. Because of the effect of the market pricing mechanism in re-
ducing their tax advantages, scores of pre-1986 tax preferences, including
the deduction for long-term capital gains,34 the accelerated deductions
made possible by the ACRS rules, 5 the Investment Tax Credit,3 6 and the
26. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 701, 710-14. This Article assumes arguendo that
Professor Cooper is correct in his view that certain tax shelters are not subject to the
market pricing mechanism. Some market constraints may, however, operate with regard
to all tax shelters. Consider, for example, a rational investor who is in the market for a
tax shelter. In deciding whether to invest in a municipal bond or in an investment that, in
Professor Cooper's view, is not subject to the market pricing mechanism, that investor
would compare the rates of return, the degrees of risk, and the effects on liquidity of each
tax shelter. Only after making those comparisons would the investor choose the invest-
ment allegedly not subject to the market pricing mechanism. If, as seems almost certain,
the investment is subjected to such comparisons, it is questionable whether the invest-
ment can be considered not subject to the market pricing mechanism.
27. See iE at 701.
28. See id. at 675-76. Internal leveraging occurs when a real estate transaction is
financed by the seller on a non-recourse basis. See ie at 710-11. In such cases, the seller
and the purchaser may artificially inflate the purchase price to enable the purchaser to
deduct higher depreciation and other expenses. As long as the financing is on a non-
recourse basis, the buyer will usually not be harmed by the inflated price. See ie at 710-
14.
29. See iE at 698-705.
30. See ie at 714-15.
31. See id at 725.
32. See ie at 714-26.
33. This Article assumes arguendo that Professor Cooper is correct that certain tax
shelters are not subject to the market pricing mechanism. See supra note 26.
34. I.RC. § 1202(a) (1982) (deduction for 60% of an individual taxpayer's "net capi-
tal gain") (repealed 1986).
35. Ie § 168 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (amended 1986).
1987]
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exclusion for interest on state and local government bonds,37 may be tol-
erable from the standpoint of tax equity. With the weakening of equity
as an argument for reform, the case for repeal or limitation of those pref-
erences (and many others) would turn almost exclusively on considera-
tions of efficiency or revenue-raising. Equally important, the course of
future tax policy might reflect the judgment that tax equity should not be
a major concern of Congress in enacting a tax preference, so long as the
preference is subject to the market pricing mechanism.
2. Evaluation
To evaluate Cooper's claim that tax-favored investments subject to the
market pricing mechanism do not raise serious equitable concerns, this
Article focuses primarily on the exclusion for interest on state and local
government bonds.38 Although the market price reflects the exclusion to
a certain extent, the implicit tax rate on municipal bonds has remained
substantially lower than the highest marginal federal tax rate.39 In 1983,
for example, the interest rate on prime municipal bonds was 8%; the
interest rate on comparable, fully-taxable bonds was 12%, resulting in an
implicit tax of approximately 331/3%.1 Since the highest federal tax rate
at that time was 50%,41 a taxpayer in the highest bracket paid effectively
one-third less in taxes on income generated by a municipal bond (33%)
than on income generated by a fully-taxable bond (50%).
Although Cooper concedes that a comparison between the after-tax
returns on municipal bonds and comparable fully-taxable investments
would reveal serious problems of inequity,42 he believes that this compar-
ison overstates the inequity caused by tax-exempt bonds because it fails
to consider the alternative tax-sheltered opportunities open to the munic-
ipal bond investor.4 3 In a world in which a tax-conscious investor could
invest in a leveraged real estate shelter, which might produce a negative
tax rate by allowing the investor to use interest deductions to offset other
income, the tax-exempt bond seems relatively benign by comparison."
Cooper argues, in addition, that the reason municipal bonds did not
carry with them an implicit tax equal to or approaching the maximum
tax rate was the availability of alternative and more attractive tax prefer-
ences that were not subject to the market pricing mechanism." Buyers
36. Id. §§ 46-48 (amended 1986).
37. Id. § 103 (amended 1986).
38. Id. § 103 (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
39. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 698-99.
40. See Salomon Brothers, 1983-84 Bond Market 33 (1984). The figures are taken
from the week of Oct. 14, 1983 and are representative of the rates of return on tax-exempt
and fully-taxable bonds for 1983. See ido
41. See I.R.C. § 1 (1982).
42. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 698-99.
43. See id. at 699-700.
44. See id at 674, 699-700.
45. See id at 699-700.
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of tax-exempt bonds gain an equitable advantage only to the extent that
"the implicit tax burden on these bonds is less than the effective burden
on investment generally, and the evidence suggests that it is questionable
whether any such advantage exists.""
But Cooper's comparison between tax-exempt bonds and other invest-
ment opportunities ignores the fact that, for many taxpayers, income
consists solely or primarily of salary or other earned income.47 Because
the implicit tax on tax-exempt bonds was lower in 1983 than the highest
marginal tax bracket, purchasers of these bonds received a tax advantage
compared to taxpayers whose income consisted solely of salary or other
earned income.4" Although Cooper may be correct that other tax prefer-
ences produce greater inequities than tax-exempt bonds, significant tax
inequity between municipal bond investors and wage earners exists to the
extent of the difference between the maximum tax rate and the implicit
tax on state and local government bonds.49
a. The Demand Curve and the Implicit Tax
Cooper's analysis may be strengthened by making an assumption,
46. See id. at 700.
47. Professor Bittker has argued that high-bracket taxpayers who invest in fully-taxa-
ble bonds cannot complain of tax inequity because they can blame only themselves for
failing to exploit the lower implicit tax on tax-exempt bonds. See Bittker, supra note 18,
at 742-44. For purposes of analysis in the text, I accept the validity of Professor Bittker's
argument as applied to holders of capital. But high-bracket wage-earners who cannot
avail themselves of the lower implicit tax on certain tax-preferred investments have a
valid claim that their wages are taxed at an inequitably high rate. See infra text accompa-
nying note 48.
48. Professor Cooper presents some casual empirical evidence that supports his view
that the market operates to price out certain tax preferences. See Cooper, supra note 6, at
708-10 (preferences for yachts and real estate). The evidence with respect to tax-exempt
bonds indicates the contrary. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. Moreover,
this Article demonstrates that merely abolishing tax preferences that are not subject to
the market pricing mechanism will not eliminate this inequity. See infra notes 54-65 and
accompanying text.
49. It is possible, of course, that income from capital generally should be taxed at a
lower rate than earned income. A number of commentators have in fact proposed that a
consumption-type tax be enacted on equitable grounds as a way of avoiding a "double
tax" on capital. See eg., N. Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax 21-53 (1955); Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974); see
also Cooper, supra note 6, at 706-07 (author refers to commentators advocating a con-
sumption tax, but does not adopt the position himself). But that position is different
from the argument that tax preferences on certain forms of income from capital do not
create inequities within the context of an income tax.
Moreover, there are plausible arguments for taxing wages at a lower rate than income
from capital. First, to earn wages one necessarily forgoes leisure. A lower rate of tax on
wages may be defended as an indirect means of taxing the imputed income from leisure
that a taxpayer with the same amount of income from capital is able to enjoy. See E.
Seligman, The Income Tax 23-24 (1911). Second, the wage-earner's ability to pay is ar-
guably less than a capitalist's ability to pay with the same amount of income because the
latter has a stock of capital to protect against future contingencies. The wage-earner, by
contrast, has a greater need to save income to guard against future contingencies.
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which seems to be implicit in his argument,5" that the repeal of shelters
not subject to the market pricing mechanism would raise the implicit tax
on remaining preferences sufficiently to eliminate, or virtually eliminate,
inequities. If those more egregious shelters were eliminated, tax-
conscious investors might be forced to bid up the price of the remaining
tax-preferred investments, including municipal bonds, thereby raising the
implicit tax. If the implicit tax were driven high enough, problems of
inequity would vanish.
In order to evaluate this scenario, it is necessary to explore the reasons
for the discrepancy between the highest tax bracket under the pre-1986
Code and the implicit tax on municipal bonds. Like any commodity, the
price of a municipal bond depends on the supply and demand for the
bond. 1 In Figure 1, DID1 represents the demand schedule for tax-
exempt bonds under the assumption that alternative investments not sub-
ject to the market pricing mechanism are available; SS represents the
supply schedule for the same bonds. The equilibrium point (P1 QI) at
which those schedules intersect determines the price (P) and quantity
(QI) of tax-exempt bonds that will be sold. 2 In 1983, the equilibrium
price produced a rate of return that was about 662/3% of the rate of
return on fully-taxable bonds of equivalent risk. Thus, with all other
things being equal,5 3 a taxpayer in 1983 in the 331/3% tax bracket would
be indifferent as between purchasing a municipal bond and a fully-taxa-
ble bond. For a taxpayer in the 50% bracket, however, the equilibrium
price on a municipal bond produced a windfall measured by the differ-
ence between the price (P,) at which that taxpayer would be indifferent as
between purchasing a municipal and a taxable bond and the actual equi-
librium price in the market. That surplus (P1-P1) represents, in economic
terms, the inequity seemingly caused by the exclusion for interest on mu-
nicipal bonds.
The crucial question is whether the surplus generated for the 50%
bracket taxpayer in municipal bonds can be eliminated by repealing the
tax preferences available on investments that are not subject to the mar-
ket pricing mechanism. Cooper's argument5 4 seems to assume that,
without those preferences, the demand for municipal bonds would in-
crease to the extent that the new equilibrium price (P 2) would equal, or at
least closely approximate, P,, the price at which the 50%-bracket tax-
50. Cooper attributes the difference between the maximum tax rate and the implicit
tax on tax-exempt bonds to the availability of investments that are not subject to the
market pricing mechanism. See id. at 700. This argument implies that without such
investments, the discrepancy between the maximum tax rate and the implicit tax on mu-
nicipal bonds would vanish.
51. See J. Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 22-24 (1976).
52. See id. at 25.
53. Specifically, the municipal bond and fully-taxable bond must be equally risky and
equally liquid. For a discussion of the relationship between the risk of an investment and
an investor's indifference curve, see id. at 70-71.
54. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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payer would no longer have a surplus by investing in a municipal bond.
In Figure 1, the increase in demand required by this argument is reflected






Assuming that municipal bonds and tax preferences not subject to the
market pricing mechanism are substitutes for each other, it is probable
that the elimination of preferences not subject to the market pricing
mechanism will cause some increase in demand for municipal bonds."
No evidence has been adduced, however, to support the contention that
the magnitude of the increase in demand will be sufficient to drive up the
equilibrium price to a point at which a taxpayer in the highest bracket
will no longer enjoy the surplus. Indeed, there is strong reason to believe
that the extent of the shift in the demand curve will be minimal at best.
All other things being equal, the shift in demand for one good caused by
the elimination of the substitute good depends on the relative share of the
combined market held by the substitute.56 In the market for tax-favored
55. See J. Hirshleifer, supra note 51, at 116.
56. This point may be understood by considering a simple illustration. Assume that
the market in tax-favored investments consists solely of tax-exempt bonds and real estate;
tax-exempt bonds comprise 90% of the market and real estate comprises 10%. If munic-
ipal bonds and real estate are not substitutes at all, the repeal of the tax preferences for
real estate will have no effect on the demand curve for municipal bonds. If municipal
1987]
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investments, the shift in demand for any remaining tax preferences
caused by the repeal of substitute tax preferences will turn on the share of
the total market in preferences held by the repealed preferences.
Prior to the enactment of the 1986 Act, the market in tax-favored in-
vestments was, of course, substantial, including, among other prefer-
ences, property subject to favorable capital gains rates, 7 property
benefiting from the Investment Tax Credit 8 or accelerated depreciation
deductions,59 tax-deferred savings,c and property generating tax-exempt
income, such as state and local government bonds.61 Of this overall mar-
ket, the share held by investments not subject to the market pricing
mechanism was small.62 Although repealing favorable tax treatment of
bonds and real estate are perfect substitutes and if all other things remain constant, inves-
tors in real estate would move the 10% of the market that is now comprised of real estate
into tax-exempt bonds. The share of the market held by tax-exempt bonds after the re-
peal of the real estate preferences would be 100%, producing a shift of only 11 1/9% in
the demand curve for tax-exempt bonds.
If, on the other hand, tax-exempt bonds comprise only 10% and real estate 90% of the
tax-shelter market, the effect on the shift in the demand curve for tax-exempt bonds
would be much greater if the preferences for real estate were repealed. If the two invest-
ments are perfect substitutes and if all other things remain constant, the 90% of the
market previously consisting of real estate investment would move into state and local
government bonds, raising their share of the market from 10% to 100% and producing a
900% shift in the demand curve for municipal bonds.
In reality, the degree of substitution between two investments is neither nil, nor perfect.
The greater the degree of substitution between investments, the greater is the shift in the
demand curve for one investment caused by the elimination of the other. See J. Hirsh-
leifer, supra note 51, at 116.
57. See I.R.C. § 1202(a) (1982) (deduction for 60% of an individual taxpayer's "net
capital gain") (repealed 1986).
58. See id. §§ 46-48 (amended 1986) (though these sections were technically
"amended" in 1986, they were effectively repealed).
59. See id. § 168 (amended 1986).
60. See, e.g., id. § 219 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (deduction for contributions to indi-
vidual retirement accounts) (amended 1986).
61. See id. § 103 (exclusion for interest on state and local government bonds)
(amended 1986).
62. Assuming that the revenue lost from various investment tax preferences (or the
revenue gained from their repeal) is a reasonable surrogate for the amount of investment
in each preference, the point in the text may be established by comparing the revenue
gain from the repeal by the 1986 Act of tax preferences for investments not subject to the
market pricing mechanism with the revenue loss attributable to other tax preferences.
The creation of Clifford Trusts and the leveraging of losses generated by tax shelters
(particularly real estate) to offset other income are the two investment tax preferences not
subject to the market pricing mechanism that figure most prominently in Cooper's analy-
sis. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 675-76, 701, 710-14, 720, 724. The revenue gain in fiscal
year 1990 from repeal of the Clifford Trust rules (and other methods of shifting income to
low-bracket taxpayers) is projected at approximately $500 million. See Conference
Comm. Rep., Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-880 to
-881 (1986). The revenue gain in 1990 from the provisions of the 1986 Act designed to
preclude leveraging of tax shelters (including the application of the "at-risk" rules to real
estate and the disallowance of passive investment losses) is projected at approximately
$11.4 billion. See id. at 11-870.
Although the sum of the revenue gains from virtual repeal of these preferences for
investments not subject to the market pricing mechanism is large ($11.9 billion), it pales
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these investments would likely increase demand for other preferences,
that increase in demand would be spread among all the remaining prefer-
ences. Thus, the effect in increasing the equilibrium price of any particu-
lar preference would be relatively insignificant.63
The preceding analysis indicates that the repeal of tax preferences for
investments not governed by the market pricing mechanism will not
solve the problems of inequity caused by tax advantages bestowed on
other investments such as municipal bonds. If, as seems virtually certain,
the equilibrium price for remaining investment preferences does not rise
sufficiently to eliminate the surplus for higher-bracket taxpayers,64 other
taxpayers, notably salaried employees, will continue to pay a tax on their
income that exceeds the implicit tax on tax-preferred investments.65
in comparison with the total revenue losses caused by other investment tax incentives.
For 1990, the following estimates were projected (prior to the passage of the 1986 Act)
for the losses in revenue from individual taxpayers attributable to other major investment
tax preferences: favorable treatment of capital gains, $34.0 billion; IRAs, S18.7 billion;
the exclusion for interest on state and local government bonds, $13.6 billion; the Invest-
ment Tax Credit, $8.0 billion; the exclusion for life insurance interest, $7.0 billion; the
exclusion for capital gains at death, $6.1 billion; accelerated depreciation on buildings
other than rental housing, $5.9 billion; tax incentives for the preservation of historic
structures, $1.9 billion; accelerated depreciation on equipment, S1.8 billion; accelerated
depreciation on rental housing, $1.6 billion; intangible drilling costs, $1.5 billion; percent-
age depletion on oil and gas, $1.1 billion; deferral of interest on savings bonds, $1.1 bil-
lion; capital gains treatment of certain agricultural income, $0.8 billion; installment sales
treatment, $0.8 billion; dividend exclusion, $0.6 billion; amortization of business start-up
costs, $0.5 billion; investment credit for buildings other than historic structures, $0.4
billion. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1986-1990 10-21 (Joint Comm. Print 1985). The sum
of these revenue losses, which represent part, but not all, of the revenue losses caused by
investment tax preferences, is $105.4 billion.
Using these projections of revenue gains and losses as surrogates for the amount in-
vested in each tax-preferred investment, investments not subject to the market pricing
mechanism probably comprised about 10% ($11.9 billion of a total of $117.3 billion) of
the total market in tax-preferred investments for individual taxpayers.
There is, of course, some overlap between investments not subject to the market pricing
mechanism and the other tax-preferred investments listed above. Real estate, for exam-
ple, is affected both by the exemption from the "at risk" rules and by accelerated depreci-
ation on buildings. It is proper, however, to determine the magnitude of the revenue
losses attributable to real estate tax preferences other than leveraging and to include real
estate to that extent among other tax-preferred investments, because repeal of only the
leveraging advantages of real estate shelters would still leave real estate with a share of
the overall market in tax preferences. This assumes, as does this entire analysis, that the
revenue loss from a preference is a reasonable surrogate for the amount invested in a tax-
preferred investment.
63. Investments not subject to the market pricing mechanism probably comprised
about 10% of the market in tax-preferred investments prior to the passage of the 1986
Act. See supra note 62. Their repeal was thus unlikely to cause more than a 11 1/9%
shift in the demand curve for any remaining tax-preferred investment. See supra note 56
and accompanying text.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 55-63.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
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b. The Demand Curve and Marginal Tax Brackets
To understand why the market pricing mechanism does not operate to
eliminate all inequities, it is helpful to analyze the demand schedule
(D1D,) for municipal bonds represented in Figure 2. As with virtually
any commodity, this schedule is downward sloping, 6 indicating that, for
any decrease in the price of municipal bonds, the quantity demanded
increases. With all other things being equal,67 it is possible to conceive of
each point (PyQy) on the demand schedule as the quantity of bonds (Qy)
demanded by taxpayers in a particular marginal tax bracket (y%) and in
all higher tax brackets.6" As the price of the bond declines below Py and
the rate of return therefore increases, lower-bracket taxpayers have an
incentive to enter the market and take advantage of the exclusion pro-
vided for interest on the bonds. Consequently, the quantity of bonds de-
manded increases. If the equilibrium price (Ps) produces a rate of return
that equals the after-tax rate of return on a fully-taxable bond for a tax-
payer in the x% tax-bracket, all taxpayers whose marginal tax bracket
exceeds x% derive a surplus from purchasing municipal bonds. The sur-
plus for a taxpayer in the highest tax bracket (z I%) is equal to the differ-
ence between P7.,-the price at which he would be indifferent as between
purchasing a tax-exempt bond and a taxable bond-and P.. 9
Viewing the demand schedule for tax-exempt bonds from this perspec-
tive makes it possible to identify a major reason for the inability of the
market to eliminate tax inequities caused by the interest exclusion. Be-
cause the equilibrium price for these bonds is determined by a demand
schedule that reflects differences in marginal tax rates, taxpayers in the
highest tax-bracket are likely to continue to derive a surplus from the
exclusion even after the repeal of preferences not subject to the market
pricing mechanism.7"
66. See J. Hirshleifer, supra note 61, at 22-23.
67. The argument that follows in the text assumes that investors are the same in all
respects other than their marginal tax brackets and specifically that investor preferences
as to liquidity, risk, and return do not vary across marginal tax brackets. A taxpayer's
marginal tax bracket would be the sole determinant of the price that he would be willing
to pay for municipal bonds. Assuming that taxpayers in lower brackets lose interest in
bonds at or above a certain price, each point (PyQy) represents quantity of bonds de-
manded at that price by taxpayers in a particular bracket (y%) and in all higher brackets.
I recognize, however, that barriers to entry, such as minimum investment requirements,
may prevent low-bracket taxpayers from participating in certain investments.
68. In Figure 2, the demand curve for municipal bonds is pictured as a straight line.
This is not strictly accurate if all things other than marginal tax brackets are considered
equal, as is assumed in the text. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Under that
assumption, the demand curve for these bonds would not be continuous, but would con-
tain steps corresponding to each marginal tax bracket.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
70. For a similar argument that differences in marginal tax rates explain the surplus
enjoyed by upper-bracket taxpayers in state and local government bonds, see Ackerman
& Ott, supra note 21, at 398.
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The relationship between the demand schedule for tax-exempt bonds
and marginal tax brackets provides an additional important insight for
tax reform efforts. If the demand schedule for municipal bonds is con-
ceived as points corresponding to the quantity of bonds demanded by
taxpayers in a particular marginal tax bracket and all higher tax brack-
ets, the enactment of a tax provision that reduces the disparity among
marginal tax brackets by lowering tax rates above x% would have the
effect of flattening the demand schedule (D2D2).7 With a flatter demand
schedule, the price (P,2) at which taxpayers in the highest tax-bracket
71. This argument may be understood by assuming that tax-exempt and taxable
bonds are perfect substitutes differing only in the tax exclusion provided for the former.
Under that assumption, taxpayers in the maximum tax bracket (zl%) would be indiffer-
ent as between purchasing tax-exempt and taxable bonds when the rate of return on tax-
exempts is (100 - zl)% of the rate on taxable bonds, i.e., when the rate of return on tax-
exempts equals the after-tax rate of return on taxable bonds. If, for example, taxable
bonds offer an interest rate of 10% and the highest tax bracket is 60%, taxpayers in that
bracket would be indifferent as between purchasing tax-exempt and taxable bonds when
tax-exempts offer a rate of return of 4%.
Assume now that the maximum rate is lowered to z2% and that all other things re-
main constant. Under this assumption, taxpayers in the highest tax bracket would be
indifferent as between tax-exempt and taxable bonds when the rate of return on tax-
exempts is (100 - z2)% of the rate on taxable bonds. If, for example, taxable bonds offer a
10% return and the new maximum tax rate is 40%, taxpayers in that bracket would be
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would be indifferent between tax-exempt bonds and taxable bonds would
be lower, thereby reducing from (P,1-P.) to (Pa-P.) the surplus from
purchasing tax-exempt bonds for those taxpayers. Thus, the effect of a
reduction in differences among marginal tax rates would be to minimize
the tax inequity between investors in tax-exempt bonds and other taxpay-
ers in the same tax bracket.
71
c. The Importance of Wholesale Repeal of Tax Preferences
The best method for further reducing the inequity caused by the mu-
nicipal bond exemption is to repeal as many other tax preferences as pos-
sible, rather than to limit reform efforts to investments not governed by
the market pricing mechanism. To understand why tax equity will be
improved by a wholesale attack on preferences, assume that in Figure 3,
D ID, represents the demand schedule for municipal bonds in a world
with a plethora of other preferences; P is the equilibrium price; and
(Py-PI) is the surplus enjoyed by a taxpayer in the top tax-bracket on
municipal bonds. The repeal of any preference that is a substitute for
tax-exempt bonds will increase demand for the latter, resulting in a shift
to the right in the demand schedule for municipal bonds (D2 D2).73 The
more substitute preferences that are repealed, the greater is the probable
shift in the demand schedule for tax-exempt bonds (DXD).
The effect of each shift in the demand curve is to improve tax equity.
Before the repeal of other preferences, the equilibrium price for tax-ex-
empt bonds was PI; after the repeal of one tax preference, the equilibrium
price increases to P2; with the repeal of other preferences, the equilibrium
price moves even higher to Px. Although the cumulative effect of the
elimination of these other preferences may still leave the new equilibrium
price for tax-exempt bonds lower than Py and thus enable the highest
bracket taxpayer to continue to enjoy a surplus from investing in tax-
exempt bonds, that surplus will have declined from (Py-PI) to (Py-P),
indifferent between tax-exempt and taxable bonds when the rate of return on tax-exempts
is 6%.
The base price (P,2) of a tax-exempt bond offering a rate of return of 6% is of course
lower than the price (P.1) of a tax-exempt bond providing a 4% return, assuming that the
amount of interest generated by each is the same. By lowering the price at which taxpay-
ers in the highest tax bracket would be indifferent between tax-exempt and taxable bonds,
the effect of a reduction in the highest tax rate is to flatten the demand curve for munici-
pal bonds. For the same reasons, a reduction in the marginal tax rate applicable to any
class of taxpayers has the effect both of lowering the price at which those taxpayers would
be indifferent as between tax-exempt and taxable bonds and of flattening the demand
curve for tax-exempt bonds.
72. Of course, a reduction in the higher tax rates might be criticized from the perspec-
tive of the fairness criterion for reducing the degree of progression of the income tax. See
infra text accompanying notes 299-305; see also Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1260-61 (dis-
cussing the fairness criterion and the level of progressivity of an income tax). Thus, the
argument in the text is directed towards the issue of horizontal equity rather than vertical
equity, as was Cooper's analysis of tax avoidance from an equity perspective. See Cooper,
supra note 6, at 707-14.
73. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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thereby reducing the inequity between investors in tax-exempt bonds and










The concepts of an implicit tax and the market pricing mechanism
contain important insights for efforts to improve the equity of the federal
income tax system. The lesson to be learned is not, however, that Con-
gress should be content to limit reform to investments that escape the
effect of the market pricing mechanism; serious inequities are likely to
persist even after the repeal of tax preferences on such investments. Tax
inequity will be substantially improved by following two very different
courses: first, reducing marginal tax rates and, second, eliminating as
many preferences as possible. As will be shown in Part II, Congress, by
enacting the 1986 Act, has heeded the true lessons of the market pricing
mechanism and recognized the centrality of reducing marginal tax rates
to mitigating tax inequity.
B. Efficiency
My previous article identified four primary inefficiencies that may re-
sult from the enactment of a tax incentive. First, an incentive may stimu-
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late excessive production of a tax-favored good or service.74 Second, an
incentive may stimulate excessive consumption of a tax-favored good or
service, causing a misallocation of resources and a decline in overall util-
ity. 75 Third, an incentive may provide tax benefits that are greater than
necessary to accomplish the government's objective in enacting the in-
centive.76 Fourth, the enactment of an incentive may increase the trans-
action costs of compliance and planning incurred by taxpayers and the
costs of administering and enforcing the law incurred by the govern-
ment.77 Using these standards, I concluded that many of the incentives
found in the pre-1986 Code generated inefficiencies. 7 Two recent law
review articles propose different standards for judging the efficiency of a
federal income tax provision which, if valid, place in doubt my original
conclusions.79
1. Efficiency Defined in Terms of Congressional Decisions
George Cooper, in the article discussed earlier, addresses indirectly the
first two of my efficiency concerns by distinguishing between tax incen-
tives that operate in the way that Congress intended and tax incentives
that provide benefits to taxpayers in an amount greater than Congress
envisioned. 0 Although Cooper recognizes that both classes of incentives
affect the allocation of resources in society,"1 he concludes that, with re-
gard to the former, the incentive is efficient in the "larger social and eco-
nomic policy sense" that "society has gotten something in return" for the
tax revenues lost due to the incentive.82 By contrast, when the incentive
produces tax savings in unintended amounts, the incentive cannot be jus-
tified on the basis of this expanded concept of efficiency because it cannot
be assumed that the social benefits of the incentive are worth its costs in
reduced revenues.8 3
This perspective broadens the efficiency debate by raising the possibil-
ity that the social benefits arising from the enactment of an incentive
justify a seeming misallocation in resources caused by the incentive. But
a test for distinguishing between efficient and inefficient tax incentives
based on intended and unintended effects is often unworkable in practice
because of the difficulty of determining whether the effects of an incentive
extend beyond those that Congress intended. 4 Consider, for example,
74. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1262, 1287.
75. See id. at 1262, 1273-74.
76. See id. at 1276.
77. See id. at 1269-70.
78. See id. at 1284, 1286-88.
79. See Cooper, supra note 6; Zelinsky, supra note 6.
80. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 696-97.
81. See id. at 695-96, 705-06.
82. See id. at 697.
83. See id.
84. Cooper himself recognizes that distinguishing between incentives with intended
and unintended effects is an inquiry often posing "large and complex questions with un-
certain answers." See id. He also states that the inquiry "resembles that made under tax
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the tax treatment of real estate prior to the passage of the 1986 Act. By
failing to subject real estate to the "at risk" rules governing other invest-
ments,"5 by providing generous ACRS allowances for real estate,8 6 and
by allowing taxpayers to convert ordinary income deductions into favor-
ably-taxed capital gains income upon the disposition of most real es-
tate,87 Congress created a combination of tax incentives that has had the
effect of shifting capital from other investments into real estate.8 8 Since
the tax advantages of the ACRS rules (deferral) and of the capital gains
provisions (rate conversion) are straightforward and readily comprehen-
sible, Congress presumably understood the revenue and other implica-
tions of their enactment.89 The effect of the exemption of real estate from
the "at-risk" rules is more abstruse because the tax advantages are indi-
rect: taxpayers are permitted to leverage real estate investments and
thereby shelter other income with the deductions or losses generated by
real estate ventures.9" For this reason, it is possible that Congress failed
to appreciate the effects of the exemption.9" On the other hand, Con-
gress, in first enacting and then extending the "at risk" rules, specifically
decided to exempt real estate.92 Subsequently, Congress strengthened the
"at risk" rules on two separate occasions without extending the rules to
expenditure analysis, insofar as it calls for a cost-benefit calculation of any subsidy." See
id' at 697 n.159. But if something like a cost-benefit analysis is required, it makes more
sense simply to subject the preference to a traditional cost-benefit calculation rather than
to try to determine whether the preference produces effects different from those intended
by Congress. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
85. See I.RIC. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982) (repealed 1986).
86. See id §§ 168(b)(2)(A), 168(c)(2)(D) (1982 & Supp. 1985) (18-year depreciation
period for most buildings) (amended 1986).
87. Generally described, the pre-1986 Code recaptured as ordinary income only the
excess of depreciation taken on real estate over straight-line depreciation. See id.
§§ 1250(a), 1250(b)(1) (amended 1986). The remaining gain was generally taxable as
capital gain. See id § 1202(a) (1982) (repealed 1986).
88. See Hendershott, The Impact of Tax Reform on the Slope of the Playing Field, 31
Tax Notes 1107 (1986). Congress has also provided tax incentives for real estate on the
consumption side, which have the effect of diverting resources into owner-occupied hous-
ing. See R Goode, The Individual Income Tax 125 (1964); E. Mills, Urban Economics
129-30 (2d ed. 1980); see also infra text accompanying notes 146-51 (listing direct and
indirect tax incentives for homeownership).
89. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 671 (implications of deferral understood by
Congress).
90. See ic at 672-76; Yorio, supra note 4, at 1286.
91. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 706-07 (benefits of leveraging unintended by
Congress).
92. In 1976, the House Ways and Means Committee proposed that limitations on
artificial losses from real estate be enacted to prevent investors in real estate shelters from
using artificial losses to offset other income. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 658, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 29-37, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2897, 2922-31.
The Senate Finance Committee rejected this provision. See S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3439, 3475. The Joint
Conference Committee decided to limit deductions from certain activities, to the amount
"at-risk," but excluded real estate. See generally H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1515, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 411-12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4118, 4122-24. With
real estate exempted, these "at-risk" rules were enacted by Congress. See Tax Reform
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cover real estate.93 In light of this legislative history, it seems doubtful
that the effects of the real estate exemption were unintended. Rather, it
is at least possible that Congress, cognizant of the tax effects, concluded
that the social benefits of increased real estate investment were worth the
costs of even an egregious tax shelter.94
In addition to the practical problem of distinguishing between incen-
tives with intended and unintended effects, a test of efficiency that defers
to congressional decision-making is suspect on theoretical grounds. Con-
sider again the congeries of tax incentives previously provided for real
estate. Even if Congress understood the full implications of these provi-
sions, the provisions may not be efficient in the broader social policy
sense if their enactment reflected not a rational calculation of the costs
and benefits to society in general, but rather the response of a legislature
to pressure brought by a powerful constituency for favorable tax treat-
ment.95 If this more skeptical interpretation is valid, or even plausible, a
test of efficiency that defers to congressional judgments is suspect because
it assumes that favorable tax treatment results from a sound analysis of
societal costs and benefits, rather than of the costs and benefits of a pow-
erful interest group or indeed of Congress itself.96 To minimize the risk
of inefficiency, every tax incentive, including those with known and in-
tended effects, should be carefully scrutinized from an economic
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204(a), 90 Stat. 1525, 1531-32 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 465 (1982)).
In 1978, the Conference Committee proposed to extend the "at risk" rules to virtually
all activities other than real estate. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
219-20, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7198, 7222-23. The exten-
sion (with the real estate exception) was enacted by Congress. See Revenue Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 201(a), 201(c)(1), 202, 203, 701(k)(2), 92 Stat. 2763, 2814-17,
2906 (1978). In the same year, Congress extended the "at risk" rules to geothermal
properties. See Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, § 402(d), 92 Stat. 3174,
3202-03 (1978).
93. In 1979, Congress considered and enacted various technical amendments
designed to strengthen the "at risk" rules without extending the rules to real estate. See
Technical Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 102(a)(1), 94 Stat. 194, 206-08
(1980); see also S. Rep. No. 498, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-46, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 316, 353-57 (legislative history of the tax shelter provisions of the
Technical Corrections Act of 1979).
In 1984, Congress considered and enacted other changes designed to strengthen the "at
risk" rules. The exemption for real estate, however, was not affected. See Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 432(a)-(c), 721(x)(2), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News (98 Stat.) 811-15, 971 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 463(c) (1982); see
also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1120, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1445, 1808-10 (legislative history of the "at-risk" provisions of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984).
94. Cooper himself seems to admit the possibility that the tax benefits accorded real
estate may have been intended by Congress. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 679.
95. For a discussion of the power and operation of the real estate lobby with respect
to tax legislation, see Farnsworth, Charge! They Whose Tax Oxen Have Been Gored, N.Y.
Times, May 9, 1986, at 22, col. 3; see also Tax Reform: Real Estate Groups Combine to
Protest Provisions in Packwood Draft Bill, 56 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-6 (March 24,
1986) (real estate groups combine to protest tax measures affecting real estate).
96. The interests of the real estate lobby and of certain legislators may coincide if, for
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perspective. 97
2. Market Failure
A different perspective on the efficiency debate is contained in an im-
portant and insightful article by Professor Edward Zelinsky, who identi-
fies three distinct concepts of efficiency in the literature of tax incentives:
universal market efficiency, sectoral efficiency, and technical efficiency.9"
Within this conceptual framework, the claim in my earlier article that a
tax subsidy distorts resource allocation by encouraging production or
consumption of the tax-favored good or service99 is founded on a notion
of sectoral efficiency. °0 The argument that a tax incentive costs the gov-
ernment more in lost revenues than the benefit produced and that it gen-
erates unproductive transaction costs 01 are criticisms grounded in what
Professor Zelinsky labels "technical efficiency." 02
a. Sectoral Efficiency and Market Failure
With respect to sectoral efficiency, Professor Zelinsky does not dispute
that tax incentives affect resource allocation in society.103 Nevertheless,
he argues that the incentive may be defensible on efficiency grounds if its
effect is to remedy a market failure. Under this assumption, the incentive
does not cause a misallocation of resources, but rather makes the market
more efficient than it would be in the absence of the incentive. 1°
Although other commentators have recognized that tax rules may be
designed to remedy market imperfections,105 Professor Zelinsky's article
offers the most systematic and plausible defense of tax incentives from
this perspective.
example, the lobby can aid the legislators' reelection efforts through political contribu-
tions.
The possibility that legislators act to maximize their own, rather than society's, inter-
ests is a subject explored by the theorists of public choice. See, e.g., Buchanan, Politics
Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and its Normative Implica-
tions, in The Theory of Public Choice-II 11, 18-19 (J. Buchanan & RL Tollison ed. 1984).
97. Even defenders of tax incentives from an efficiency perspective recognize that
there are certain tax incentives with known and intended effects that operate inefficiently.
See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1035 (criticism of exclusion for interest on state and
local government bonds as inefficient). See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
98. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 975, 980-95.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
100. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 986-92.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
102. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 992-95. Professor Zelinsky may be the first person
to use the term "technical efficiency" in the context of income tax policy. See id at 992
n.40.
103. See id at 987-92.
104. See id at 1002-05.
105. See, e.g., R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 280-81 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing
the imposition of an excise tax on pollution equal to its societal costs); A. Okun, Equality
and Efficiency 11, 12 (1975) (rationale for government intervention rests on externalities);
Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1261 n.52 (same).
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It is impossible to do complete justice to Professor Zelinsky's rich
analysis of sectoral efficiency within the confines of this Article. Two
illustrations may suffice, however, to give the reader a sense of his funda-
mental thesis. Assume that in the widget industry, significant barriers to
entry prevent the production of an optimal amount of widgets. If the
industry is given a tax incentive, its effect will be to draw capital from
other industries. With the instillation of additional capital in the indus-
try, production of widgets will move closer to the optimal level.
Although the incentive has changed the allocation of resources in society,
its effect is to improve efficiency if it remedies the market failure caused
by barriers to entry in the widget market."0 6
Analogous market imperfections may justify the enactment of a tax
incentive to spur consumption. Suppose, for example, that the demand
for owner-occupied housing is lower than optimal because many poten-
tial buyers face obstacles in obtaining requisite financing. To overcome
that barrier to entry, a mortgage interest deduction may be enacted to
raise the demand for owner-occupied housing to a more efficient level. 107
Drawing on the literature of the law and economics movement,10 8 Pro-
fessor Zelinsky points out that production or consumption activities may
generate positive or negative externalities for which the market fails to
compensate. °9 The enactment of a tax incentive may be defended as a
means of compensating for the market's inability to internalize the costs
of these externalities. 10 Once again, two examples may help to clarify
this insight. Suppose that an indigenous and vital steel industry is essen-
tial to meeting the Nation's defense needs domestically in times of war
when foreign sources of supply may be cut off. Although the survival of
the industry generates a significant positive externality in the form of
national security, American producers will be unable to reflect the benefit
of that externality in their prices without losing customers to foreign
competition. A tax incentive may be enacted to remedy the market's
failure to compensate for the increase in societal utility generated by the
survival of domestic steel producers.'
Similar externalities may flow from consumption activities. Owner-
occupied housing may be desirable because homeowners are likely to
106. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1002-04.
107. See id. at 1004-05.
108. The literature of the law and economics movement is voluminous. Two seminal
articles were published in the early 1960's. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distri-
bution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Among the more influential and oft cited books are G. Cala-
bresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3d ed.
1986).
109. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1005-08.
110. See id. Other commentators have previously suggested that tax rules might be
designed to compensate for the market's inability to internalize externalities. See, e.g.,
Wiedenbeck, Paternalism and Income Tax Reform, 33 U. Kansas L. Rev. 675, 683-84
(1985); Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1261 n.52, 1276 n.187.
111. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1006-07.
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take better care of their property, or because homeowners are more in-
clined than renters to participate in anti-crime efforts or to assume other
civic responsibilities, thus generating positive externalities for the com-
munity.112 Because the market is unable to compensate for the benefits
generated by these externalities, society may suffer an overall loss in util-
ity unless owner-occupied housing is encouraged by the enactment of a
tax incentive such as the mortgage interest deduction.' 13
b. Market Failure as a Defense of Pre-1986 Federal Tax Incentives
Although Professor Zelinsky's analysis can be used to defend tax in-
centives on efficiency grounds, his own conclusions with regard to the
actual efficiency of tax incentives are somewhat tentative." 4 Indeed, his
primary argument is not that tax incentives are generally efficient, but
simply that a case can be made for particular tax incentives on grounds
of efficiency.' 15 Consistent with this view, he defends the mortgage inter-
est deduction," 6 but criticizes the exclusion for interest on state and local
government bonds. 17 Despite the tentativeness of his conclusions, it is
important to determine whether remedying market failures provides a
convincing explanation for the tax incentives found in the pre-1986 Code.
Two facts indicate that the tax incentives found in the pre-1986 Code
were not intended and did not operate in general to remedy market fail-
ures. First, few, if any, of the incentives were explicitly defended in the
legislative debates as remedies for specific market failures.' 18 Although it
is possible that Congress was intuitively aware of market failures and
responded by enacting incentives as cures, 19 the virtual absence of direct
evidence of that purpose suggests that remedying market failures was
probably not a prime concern of Congress in providing tax incentives.
Second, the generality of many of the most criticized of the pre-1986
incentives belies an argument that they were enacted as remedies for spe-
112. See id. at 1007.
113. See id. at 1007-08.
114. See iL at 1019-20.
115. See id at 1036.
116. See id, at 1024-26. Professor Zelinsky notes that the effects of the deduction,
while efficient, are unpalatable. See iL at 1026.
117. See id at 1035. Other commentators agree that the exclusion for interest on state
and local government bonds is inefficient. See &g., Ackerman & Ott, supra note 21, at
398; Toder & Neubig, Revenue Cost Estimates of Tax Expenditures: The Case of Tax-
Exempt Bonds, 38 Nat'1 Tax J. 395 (1985).
118. This point is admittedly difficult to prove with certainty without reading every
page of the legislative history of every tax incentive provided by federal tax law. But in
the course of his elaborate and lengthy defense of tax incentives as remedies for market
failure, Professor Zelinsky adduces not a single reference to the legislative history of any
tax incentive as empirical support for his thesis. See Zelinsky, supra note 6. I, too, am
unaware of evidence in the legislative history of federal income tax incentives that would
support the view that these incentives are designed to remedy market failures.
119. Cf id. at 1036 (Congressional enactment of tax subsidy may reflect "intuitive"
awareness of the procedural efficiency of the tax system).
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cific market failures. 120 To be sure, the Code does contain certain provi-
sions that are sufficiently narrow in scope to support an argument that
they were enacted to remedy specific market failures. Five-year amorti-
zation of the basis of qualifying pollution control facilities,' 2' for exam-
ple, might be defended as a method of rectifying the market's inability to
force a polluter to internalize the costs of the negative externalities im-
posed on society by the pollution.'22 Special tax credits for the rehabili-
tation of historic structures'23 might be justified on the grounds that
renovation of an historic building generates considerable positive exter-
nalities for which the owner would not be compensated by the market.
Whether these tax provisions actually operate to improve efficiency is an
issue that is likely to be difficult to resolve,' 24 but their narrowness at
least suggests that they may have been enacted by Congress to cure spe-
cific market failures.
By contrast, the broad scope of the majority pre-1986 tax incentives
makes it extremely unlikely that they were designed to remedy specific
market failures. With respect to investment and production incentives,
for example, the most important Code provisions were virtually universal
in their reach: the capital gains provisions applied to almost all invest-
ment property; 125 the Investment Tax Credit applied to investments in
virtually all machinery and equipment; 26 and the ACRS rules applied to
all property within certain classes.127 Similarly, deductions for items of
consumption were simply too broad to support an argument that curing
market failures was their justification: virtually all state and local taxes
were deductible, not just property taxes on owner-occupied housing; 2 .
120. Cf R. Goode, supra note 88, at 126:
There is no evidence that the present income tax treatment of owner-occupied
houses was deliberately devised to promote housing and homeownership. The
personal deductions for interest and tax payments are general allowances. Nor
does the omission of imputed rent indicate special concern for housing, since
other imputed income is also omitted.
121. See I.R.C. § 169 (1982).
122. Cf. R. Posner, supra note 108, at 353-58 (to force polluter to internalize the costs
of pollution, a tax may be imposed).
123. See I.R.C. §§ 46(a), 46(b)(4) (amended 1986), 48(g)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 133-65.
125. See I.R.C. §§ 1202(a) (repealed 1986), 1221 (1982).
126. See id. § 48(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (definition of property qualifying for
investment tax credit). Certain property did qualify for a larger tax credit, however. See,
e.g., id. § 46(b)(2), (4) (amended 1986) (certain energy-related property and certain reha-
bilitation expenses). With respect to such property, the claim is more plausible that the
additional credit was provided to remedy a market failure. See supra text accompanying
note 123.
127. See I.R.C. § 168(c)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (amended 1986).
The universality of the incentives discussed in the text accompanying notes 125-27
supra did not keep them from causing serious distortions in resource-allocation, in part
because the impact of the incentives varied from industry to industry. For studies dem-
onstrating the inefficiency of various pre-1986 investment tax incentives, see sources cited
in note 323 infra.
128. See I.R.C. § 164(a) (1982) (amended 1986); cf. R. Goode, supra note 88, at 126-27
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interest was deductible on all loans to finance personal consumption, not
just on mortgages on owner-occupied housing.' 29 Moreover, each of
these deductions or credits was available to all taxpayers, not just to tax-
payers who might be faced with barriers to entry in the market.' 30 The
revenue losses and incentive effects associated with these tax incentives
were presumably much greater than those of narrower provisions that
could have operated as cures for specific market failures.' 3 Hence, it is
reasonably safe to conclude that the general effect of the tax incentives
found in the pre-1986 Code was to distort resource allocation without
offsetting efficiency gains.
c. Market Failure as a Defense of a Particular Tax Incentive
Even if the pre-1986 tax incentives were not intended and did not oper-
ate in general to remedy market failures, it is possible that a particular
tax incentive may have the effect of rectifying market imperfections.' 3 2
In practice, however, an efficiency analysis of a specific tax incentive in
terms of market failure is likely to prove inconclusive, as Professor Zelin-
sky himself concedes. 13 3 Consider, for example, the deduction for inter-
est on mortgages used to finance the purchase of owner-occupied houses.
Professor Zelinsky makes an appealing case for this particular tax incen-
tive on the grounds that the deduction serves to counteract sectoral ineffi-
ciencies such as barriers to entry in the market' 3' and that owner-
occupied housing generates positive externalities in the form of height-
ened civic responsibility and increased values for surrounding
property. 135
Despite these persuasive arguments, evidence that owner-occupied
housing generates significant negative externalities weakens the case for
(generality of tax preferences belies deliberate congressional design to subsidize owner-
occupied housing).
129. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982).
130. See sources cited supra notes 125-29. Indeed, because of graduated tax rates, the
primary benefit of many of the preferences (for example, the mortgage income deduction)
flows to upper-income taxpayers who face lower barriers to entry in the market because of
their high income levels. See infra text accompanying notes 162 & 183-85; cf. Makin &
Allison, Tax Reform 1986: A Fragile Victory, 34 Tax Notes 251, 258 (1987) ("affluent
who already own homes, not the young seeking to buy homes," benefit heavily from
preferences for homeownership).
131. For 1986, the following revenue losses were projected for the various investment
tax incentives discussed in the text: Investment Tax Credit, $30.9 billion; accelerated
depreciation deductions, $4.0 billion; favorable treatment of capital gains, S30.3 billion;
special credits for historic structures, $125 million; five-year amortization of pollution
control facilities, $115 million. See Congressional Budget Office, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Tax Expenditures: Current Issues and Five-Year Budget Projections for Fiscal Years
1982-86 81-84 (1981).
132. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1036.
133. See id. at 1023, 1035-36.
134. See id. at 998-1001, 1007.
135. See id. at 1007.
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the mortgage interest deduction as a remedy for market failure.' 36 By
facilitating the purchase of suburban and exurban homes, the deduction
may lead to a decline in central cities as centers of culture and commu-
nity identification.137 Dispersal of the population may also result in in-
creased dependence on oil, 138 a once scarce and potentially critical
resource, and may make American foreign policy subject to control or
influence by oil-producing nations. Moreover, because the poorest mem-
bers of society are unable to take advantage of the deduction, 139 the in-
centive may lead to greater racial or class segregation. 140
In addition to generating negative externalities, owner-occupied hous-
ing may be more costly than rental housing in two other respects. First,
specialization of function within the economy usually minimizes costs. 141
If the housing market resembles other industries in this respect, land-
lords, as specialists, may be able to provide services at a lower cost than
homeowners. 142 Second, rental housing benefits from economies of scale
that are usually unobtainable in communities of owner-occupied
homes. 143 By skewing resource allocation towards owner-occupied hous-
ing, the mortgage interest deduction may prevent the market from satis-
fying demands for housing at minimal cost.
Moreover, if it were assumed that market failure justifies some govern-
ment intervention in the market for owner-occupied housing, enacting
(or preserving) a mortgage interest deduction may be inefficient if other
forms of government subsidies-either direct or indirect-already oper-
ate to remedy the market failure. Thus, an efficiency analysis of the de-
duction would have to include direct government subsidies provided for
owner-occupied housing, such as government-insured mortgages144 and
real estate tax abatements for certain classes of homeowners. 145 More-
over, federal tax law itself provides substantial subsidies to homeowner-
ship apart from the mortgage-interest deduction. To begin with, the
136. Professor Zelinsky recognizes that owner-occupied housing may generate nega-
tive externalities, but his catalogue of those externalities is quite limited. Compare id. at
1007-08 (acknowledging one possible negative externality of homeownership) with infra
text accompanying notes 137-40 (discussing three other negative externalities of
homeownership).
137. See Lowry, The Dismal Future of Central Cities, in The Prospective City 160-203
(A. Solomon ed. 1980).
138. See E. Mills, supra note 88, at 202; The Prospective City 260 (A. Solomon ed.
1980).
139. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
140. See E. Mills, supra note 88, at 126-27; cf. Pettigrew, Racial Change and the In-
trametropolitan Distribution of Black Americans, in The Prospective City 62-65 (A. Solo-
mon ed. 1980) (discussing segregation in metropolitan areas).
141. See, e.g., J. Hirshleifer, supra note 51, at 218-19, 227 (discussing cost reduction
due to specialization).
142. See R. Goode, supra note 88, at 127.
143. For an analysis of economies of scale, see J. Hirshleifer, supra note 51, at 258-62.
144. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1707-15 (1982 & Supp. 1983) (federal mortgage insurance).
145. See, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 458-59, 467 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1987) (real estate tax exemptions for veterans, the disabled, and senior citizens).
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Code permits homeowners to deduct real property taxes,'" which would
otherwise be a nondeductible consumption expense.'47 Federal tax law
provides an additional, implicit subsidy by not taxing the "net imputed
rental value" of owner occupied housing. 4 ' The Code also allows cer-
tain taxpayers to exclude up to $125,000 of the gain on the sale of a
home'4 9 and permits all taxpayers to defer tax on the gain from the sale
of a home if certain conditions are satisfied.' 5° Given the magnitude of
these direct and indirect subsidies to homeownership,' 5 ' the mortgage
interest deduction may actually cause a misallocation of resources in so-
ciety by overcompensating for any market failure that might exist in the
absence of government subsidies.
Where, then, does the case for the deduction as a cure for market fail-
ure stand? It is generally agreed that the deduction shifts resources from
rental housing and other investments into owner-occupied housing."5 2
That apparent distortion may be illusory, however, if owner-occupied
housing would otherwise be produced in a less than optimal amount be-
cause of sectoral inefficiencies or if owner-occupied housing generates
positive externalities for which the market fails to compensate.' 53 On the
other hand, the deduction may be attacked on the grounds that it gener-
ates negative externalities, increases the costs of providing housing, and
overcompensates for the effects, if any, of market failure when combined
with other subsidies for owner-occupied housing."
In light of these arguments for and against the deduction, a rigorous
economic analysis of the deduction would require that a dollar amount
146. See I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (1982).
147. See id. § 262.
148. See B. Bittker, L. Stone, & W. Klein, Federal Income Taxation 114 (6th ed.
1984).
If the imputed income from owner-occupied housing were taxed, the homeowner
would be entitled to a deduction for all costs incurred to generate that imputed income
(including mortgage interest and real estate taxes). See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1273
n.163. Thus, the subsidy from failing to tax imputed income is not the entire imputed
rental value of the home, but only the "net imputed rental value," i.e., the excess of the
imputed rental value over the costs of maintaining the home.
149. See I.R-C. § 121 (1982).
150. See id. § 1034 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (amended 1986).
151. The federal tax subsidy for homeownership is quite large even without the mort-
gage interest deduction. For fiscal year 1979, the revenue loss from failing to tax the net
imputed rental income of owner-occupied housing was estimated at S14 billion to S17
billion. See Congressional Budget Office, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., The Tax Treatment of
Homeownership: Issues and Options 20 (1981). For fiscal year 1987, the estimated reve-
nue loss due to the deductibility of real property taxes has been estimated at SI 1.7 billion;
the loss due to the exclusion of gain on certain home sales, at $2. I billion; the loss due to
the deferral of gain on home sales, at $6.4 billion. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1986-90 13
(Joint Comm. Print 1985).
152. See, eg., B. Bittker, L. Stone, & W. Klein, supra note 148, at 114-15; E. Mills,
supra note 88, at 130.
153. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 998-1001, 1007.
154. See supra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
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be assigned to each of the positive and negative externalities generated by
the deduction and that empirical evidence be adduced on the relative
costs of providing owner-occupied and rental housing, on the degree of
sectoral inefficiency, if any, that exists in the market without a deduction,
and on the effect of other government subsidies in curing any sectoral
inefficiency or in compensating for any externality. Since it is virtually
certain that Congress will not be presented with evidence of this nature
in its deliberations with regard to any proposed or existing tax incen-
tive, 55 neither the proponents nor the opponents of the deduction are
likely to establish their case.
Given the probability that the evidence adduced with respect to the
efficiency of a particular tax incentive will be inconclusive, Professor Ze-
linsky asserts that the crucial issue may be on whom to place the burden
of proof and that opinions may vary on this issue depending on an indi-
vidual's general predilections towards government intervention in the
economy.156 With respect to the mortgage interest deduction, he appar-
ently would place the burden of proof on those "asserting the ineffi-
ciency" of the incentive,1 57 in part because "externalities and barriers to
entry" exist in the housing market.1 58
For various reasons, it is difficult to accept the view that the opponents
of the mortgage interest deduction should have the burden of proving its
inefficiency. To begin with, the deduction has been estimated to cost the
federal government $30.3 billion in lost revenues for fiscal year 1987.159
Were a direct subsidy in the same amount proposed for owner-occupied
housing, it would seem reasonable to expect the proponents of the sub-
sidy to bear the burden of demonstrating that the benefits of the subsidy
exceed its cost.160 Moreover, the poorest members of the population gen-
erally get no benefit from the subsidy provided by the mortgage-interest
deduction for a number of reasons: they cannot afford owner-occupied
housing; they do not itemize their personal deductions; or they have no
income tax liability.16 1 With respect to the remainder of the population,
the benefits of this tax subsidy flow in proportionately greater amounts to
155. Cf Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1023 (difficult to quantify barriers to entry, external-
ities, and transaction costs).
156. See id. at 1023-24.
157. See id. at 1026.
158. See id. at 1024, 1026. Professor Zelinsky also defends the deduction as a techni-
cally efficient method of curing market failures associated with owner-occupied housing.
See id. at 1026. See generally text accompanying notes 166-208 (discussing the technical
efficiency of tax incentives and direct subsidies). For a discussion of the technical effi-
ciency of income tax incentives, see generally infra text accompanying notes 166-208.
159. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1986-90 13 (Joint Comm. Print 1985).
160. The arguments in the text assume, of course, that tax expenditures ought to be
treated the same as direct subsidies in terms of the cost-benefit analysis required to justify
them. Professor Zelinsky seems to agree. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1029-33. See
infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
161. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 720-25 (1970).
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upper-middle and upper-income taxpayers because of graduated tax
rates.162 Since it is likely that the proponents of a similar direct subsidy
for owner-occupied housing would bear the burden of proof, it seems
highly unlikely that the opponents of a tax incentive would be required to
shoulder the burden of proving its inefficiency." 3
The mortgage interest deduction is used in Professor Zelinsky's analy-
sis as an archetypical tax incentive to support the thesis that certain tax
incentives may be justified as cures for market failures.' The preceding
discussion reveals, however, that the case for the deduction on efficiency
grounds is uneasy at best. Without denying that the possibility of market
failure may be relevant to an efficiency analysis of certain tax incen-
tives, '65 market-failure justifications may have limited practical utility if
they fail to convince in the archetypical case.
3. Technical Efficiency
If the assumption is made that a case for government intervention in
some form exists to achieve a societal goal, such as remedying market
failure, the question then becomes which form of government interven-
tion, tax incentive or direct subsidy, is a more efficient means of accom-
plishing the government's objective. Critics of tax expenditures have
identified four primary inefficiencies that may result from using the tax
law to bring about societal goals. First, tax incentives frequently reward
taxpayers for doing what they would do anyway.' 66 To the extent that
taxpayers do in fact receive a windfall, the government is deprived of tax
revenues without offsetting societal benefits. Second, tax expenditures
are more likely to escape rigorous cost-benefit analysis than direct subsi-
dies. This is partly because the passage (or retention) of a tax preference
is politically easy and partly because tax subsidies are not enacted or
administered by the Congressional committees and executive agencies
that are most familiar with the underlying problem that justifies govern-
ment intervention.167 Third, a tax system containing preferences benefit-
ing certain classes of taxpayers is likely to increase the resentment of
other taxpayers. Perceptions of inequity may induce disgruntled taxpay-
162. For taxpayers in the 28% bracket, the cost to the government of every dollar of
interest deducted is $0.28; for taxpayers in 15% bracket, the cost to the government is
only 50.15. See M. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 143-44 (4th ed. 1985); An-
drews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 310 (1972);
Surrey, supra note 161, at 720-25.
163. Cf. R. Goode, supra note 88, at 127 (homeownership subsidy should be designed
to benefit low- and middle-income taxpayers).
164. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 976.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23 and infra text accompanying notes
370-72, 379-80.
166. See Surrey, supra note 161, at 719-20; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1276.
167. See Surrey supra note 161, at 728-31; cf Berger, In Behalf of a Single-Rate Flat
Tax, 29 St. Louis U.L.J. 993, 1020 (1985) (direct subsidies have "higher visibility, ac-
countability, and prospect for periodic review" than tax incentives). See infra notes 189-
90 and accompanying text.
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ers to cheat on their returns, leading to losses in revenue and further
erosion of confidence in the system. 168 Fourth, the enactment of a tax
incentive generates unproductive transaction costs in the form of plan-
ning and compliance by taxpayers and in the form of enforcement and
administration by government. 169
Although Professor Zelinsky admits that certain tax incentives may
generate technical inefficiencies, 70 he correctly argues that the critical
issue is not whether tax expenditures are occasionally inefficient, but
whether in a particular case a tax expenditure would be more or less
inefficient than a direct subsidy in accomplishing the government's objec-
tive. '7 Further, he argues that all the inefficiencies associated with tax
expenditures may also result from a direct subsidy program: government
grants occasionally reward recipients for what they would do anyway; 172
direct subsidy programs sometimes escape rigorous cost-benefit analy-
sis; 173 citizens resent government largesse in the form of direct grants if it
is perceived to be excessive; 174 and a direct subsidy program frequently
results in considerable costs both to recipients in qualifying for a grant
and in complying with its terms, and to the government in administering
the program. 175 Finally, in what is probably his most acute and counter-
intuitive contribution to the debate about technical efficiency, Professor
Zelinsky contends that tax expenditures may actually reduce transaction
costs by enabling the government and citizens to utilize the existing tax
system, at relatively low marginal cost, to disseminate and obtain infor-
mation about government policies. 176
a. The Problem of Design
One of the most serious and frequent criticisms leveled against tax in-
centives is that they reward taxpayers for engaging in activities that they
would engage in without the benefit of a tax preference. 177 Perhaps the
simplest illustration is the deduction for charitable contributions. Since
some charitable giving would occur without favorable tax treatment, the
deduction, by allowing taxpayers who itemize to deduct the full amount
of their charitable contributions during the taxable year, provides tax re-
lief that is greater than necessary to accomplish the government's pre-
sumed goal of encouraging charitable giving. To the extent that the
168. See 1 Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 9, 16; President's Proposals, supra note 2,
at 2; Caplin, The Travel and Entertainment Expense Problem, 39 Taxes 947, 963 (1961);
Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1256.
169. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1256-57; cf R. Posner, supra note 108, at 473-74
(progressive rates and tax loopholes increase costs of planning).
170. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1009-10.
171. See id. at 1026-33.
172. See id. at 1032.
173. See id. at 1029-30.
174. See id. at 1027 & n.106.
175. See id. at 1011-12.
176. See id. at 1010-12.
177. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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government is deprived of tax revenues without an offsetting incentive
effect, the deduction may be regarded as inefficient.17 Defenders of tax
incentives argue, however, that a direct subsidy program might be
equally inefficient. 79 Subsidies to charities again provide the simplest
example. If the deduction for charitable contributions were repealed and
a matching-grant program were enacted in its stead, the government
would be called upon to match contributions that might have been made
without the program. As with the deduction, the government incurs a
cost without an offsetting benefit in the form of increased charitable
giving.
Although it is true that windfalls may result from both tax incentives
and direct grant programs, the risk is usually less when government in-
tervention takes the form of a direct subsidy. A subsidy program can be
targeted precisely to the particular regions, states, groups, or individuals
who are in need of government help or whose behavior the government
wants to influence.18 0 The design of tax incentives, by contrast, suffers
almost inevitably from overbreadth or underbreadth or both. Tax incen-
tives are often broader than necessary to accomplish the government's
objective because drawing distinctions among states or regions of the
country is difficult in a nationwide income-tax system or because restrict-
ing preferences to certain industries or classes of taxpayers may produce
a tax system of daunting complexity.' Tax incentives are frequently
narrower than necessary because they can affect the behavior only of citi-
zens and corporations who are within the tax system and subject to fed-
eral income tax liability.' 82
A significant risk of design inefficiency is also inherent in many tax
subsidies because of the way in which their incentive effect is distributed
among income groups. The value of an income tax deduction depends on
a taxpayer's marginal tax bracket: the higher the bracket, the greater the
tax savings from obtaining a deduction.8 3 The incentive to engage in
conduct desired by the government thus increases as income rises when-
ever a tax incentive takes the form of a deduction. Although attempts
have been made to justify this "upside-down" incentive effect in particu-
lar cases,"8 4 tax deductions tend to be inefficient in design because they
provide the greatest tax benefits to taxpayers who, even without an incen-
tive, can afford to engage in the activity that the government is seeking to
178. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1276-77.
179. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1032.
180. See Gephardt & Wessel, Tax Reform: A "But-For" Test, 29 St. Louis U.LJ. 895,
908 (1985).
181. Cf Surrey, supra note 161, at 731 (incentives "cause confusion and a blurring of
concepts and objectives").
182. See, eg., Andrews, supra note 162, at 311 n.4 (relief provided by an investment
tax credit is confined to person having a positive tax liability).
183. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
184. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1025 (positive externalities generated by housing





Defenders of tax incentives argue that the availability of the data con-
tained in the tax-expenditure budget has reduced, if not eliminated, the
risk that a tax subsidy will survive if its cost, in the form of lost revenues,
exceeds its benefits. That risk is, in any event, no greater than the risk
that a direct subsidy program will fail the test of a rigorous cost-benefit
analysis."8 6 Critics of tax incentives are enjoined to accept the conse-
quences of their own identification of tax expenditures with direct subsi-
dies by treating the two forms of government intervention as functional
equivalents.18 7 Defenders of indirect tax subsidies also argue that the sur-
vival of so many tax expenditures after the advent of tax expenditure
analysis evinces Congress's conclusion that the benefits produced out-
weigh the costs in lower revenues.188
Although the information made available in the last twenty years re-
garding the true costs of tax expenditures has undeniably had a positive
effect by enabling Congress to subject these indirect subsidies to closer
scrutiny, it is wrong to conclude that tax expenditures may now be
equated with direct subsidies for all purposes. There is no reason to as-
sume that, merely because the cost of a tax expenditure is known, the tax
preference is as difficult to enact (or preserve) as a direct subsidy pro-
gram. Despite the recent debates over tax reform and the heightened
public awareness about tax preferences, it probably remains politically
easier for Congress to provide an indirect subsidy through the tax system
than to provide an equivalent direct subsidy. A direct-subsidy program
requires Congress to engage in a two-step process: first, it must raise
revenues to fund the program; then, it must enact the program. A tax
expenditure, by contrast, requires only one step and that step is seem-
ingly benign: Congress enacts a tax preference that simply lets the earner
of income keep it. It is, in sum, more difficult for government to wrest
185. See Andrews, supra note 162, at 309-10; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1275-76.
Professor Zelinsky points out, however, that direct subsidies may also confer the great-
est benefits on upper-income taxpayers. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1031-32. But while
the "upside-down" effect is not structurally inevitable with a direct subsidy program, it is
inevitable with a tax deduction. Of course, it is possible to provide tax incentives in the
form of credits or vanishing deductions that will not operate to favor upper-income tax-
payers. See Surrey, supra note 161, at 723-24; Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1032. Nonethe-
less, even if all tax deductions were converted into credits to avoid the "upside-down"
effect, the inability to influence the behavior of citizens outside of the tax system would
remain a serious objection to the use of tax incentives rather than direct subsidies. See
supra note 182 and accompanying text.
186. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1029-33.
187. See id. at 1032-33.
188. See id. at 1033. This argument resembles the argument criticized earlier in the
text that a tax incentive with known and intended effects is efficient in the larger social
policy sense that Congress presumably concluded, in enacting the incentive, that its over-
all social benefits were worth the costs in reduced revenues. See supra text accompanying
notes 80-96.
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income from certain taxpayers and redistribute it to other taxpayers than
it is to permit the latter simply to keep their own income by virtue of a
tax preference. This fact seems to have been grasped by certain propo-
nents of tax preferences, who defend these indirect subsidies because they
enable government to accomplish objectives that would be difficult, if not
impossible, to fund directly.'8 9 The point remains, however, that the de-
gree of difficulty in enacting a tax preference and the rigor of the cost-
benefit analysis applied to a tax expenditure are likely to be less severe
than for an equivalent direct subsidy program. 190
The process by which tax subsidies are enacted and administered also
increases the risk that they would fail a cost-benefit test. To begin with, a
tax subsidy enters the Code after review primarily by the House Ways
and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.' 9 ' Charged
principally with matters of tax and finance, both committees are usually
less informed about the specifics of the problems justifying government
intervention than those Congressional committees that grapple regularly
with the problems.'92 Moreover, the duty of administering tax subsidies
is left to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which generally has no par-
ticular expertise with respect to the problem that the preference was en-
acted to remedy. 193 Although it may be theoretically possible for the
relevant tax committees and the IRS to obtain and digest the information
required to make a rational cost-benefit decision about a specific tax ex-
penditure, 94 the process of education and learning is likely to be haphaz-
ard and incomplete. As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible for
two congressional committees and one administrative agency to master
the plethora and diversity of proposals for using the Code to accomplish
societal goals. 195
c. The Cost of Taxpayer Disaffection
The defenders of tax expenditures point out that citizens may be disaf-
fected whenever they perceive that other citizens are obtaining excessive
benefits from the government whether in the form of tax expenditures or
direct subsidies. 196 But the concern of many who criticize the use of the
Code to achieve societal goals other than a proper distribution of the tax
burden is not simply that taxpayers are disaffected by perceived injus-
189. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 110, at 680-81, 688-92; see also Berger, supra note
167, at 1005 (discussing the view that voter support for government programs would
diminish if they understood the costs of indirect tax expenditures); Surrey, supra note
161, at 733-34 (same).
190. See Andrews, supra note 162, at 311 n.4 (tax provisions tend "not to be subjected
to the same budgetary and appropriations procedures as are applied to equivalent direct
expenditure programs"); Surrey, supra note 161, at 733-34.
191. See Surrey, supra note 161, at 728.
192. See id.
193. See icL at 729.
194. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1030.
195. Cf. Gephardt & Wessel, supra note 180, at 904.
196. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1027-28.
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tices. Rather, the more immediate problem caused by a perception that
the tax system is unfair is that taxpayers may act on their disenchant-
ment by failing to carry out one of the essential duties of citizenship, the
payment of taxes to support government activities for the common
good.19 7 Although citizens may be dismayed by the payment of direct
subsidies to farmers or other interest groups, the nexus between the sub-
sidies and the payment of taxes is sufficiently remote that its effect on
taxpayer compliance with the tax laws is minimal. 98 A pervasive feeling
that the tax system is unfair, by contrast, seems more likely to convince
taxpayers to avoid or evade the tax laws as a way of rectifying the inequi-
ties of favors bestowed on other taxpayers. The effect is not only to de-
prive the government of revenues, but also to undermine the entire self-
assessment system of determining tax liability.' 99
d. The Problem of Transaction Costs
Critics of tax expenditures argue that the enactment of tax incentives,
by increasing the complexity of the tax system, generates unproductive
transaction costs in planning and compliance by taxpayers and in admin-
istration and enforcement by government. 2 1 In response, Professor Ze-
linsky argues that using tax incentives to achieve societal goals may
actually generate lower transaction costs than direct subsidy programs.20 1
Professor Zelinsky's analysis starts with the premise that the tax system
represents an information and communication network that can be ex-
ploited at relatively low marginal cost to communicate information about
government policies.20 2 Both taxpayers and the government necessarily
engage in the process of filing and auditing tax returns on an annual
basis. As part of that process, the government may be able to reduce the
197. See 1 Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 9; Caplin, supra note 168, at 947, 963;
Gephardt & Wessel, supra note 180, at 909; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1256; cf Yorio,
Federal Income Tax Rulemaking: An Economic Approach, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 32
(1982) [hereinafter Yorio II] (costs of legal error include taxpayer disaffection with the
system).
198. By contrast, taxpayer attitudes towards the income tax do affect the level of com-
pliance. See Witte & Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax
Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 Nat'l Tax J. 1, 9 (1985);
New IRS Commissioner Gibbs Sees Tax Compliance Benefits From Overhaul Bill, 176
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at K-1 (Sept. 11, 1986) (comments of I.R.S. Commissioner Gibbs
that perceptions of fairness will increase compliance); cf 1 Treasury Report, supra note 2,
at 16 (perception of unfairness "is different when the tax system, rather than direct spend-
ing, is used to provide subsidies").
199. See 1 Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 9; President's Proposals, supra note 2, at 2;
Yorio II, supra note 197, at 47-48. For empirical evidence that taxpayers regard the
federal income tax as unfair, see Weinstein & Gross, Tax Bill Gives Federalism Another
Chance, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1986, at 34, col. 4 (40% of taxpayers regard the federal
income tax as "the least fair of all taxes"). For empirical evidence that taxpayer attitudes
affect the level of compliance, see Witte & Woodbury, supra note 198, at 6-9.
200. See R. Posner, supra note 108, at 474; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1256-57; Yorio II,
supra note 192, at 49.
201. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1010-12.
202. See id. at 1010.
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costs of communicating information about its policies by enacting a tax
incentive and including information about the incentive in the annual tax
return materials.2"' The marginal costs to taxpayers of obtaining infor-
mation about government policies may also be relatively low if govern-
ment intervention takes the form of a tax incentive because taxpayers
already engage lawyers and other experts to facilitate the filing of yearly
tax returns. 204 To the extent that the marginal communication costs of a
tax incentive are lower than those generated by a direct subsidy program,
the incentive may be more efficient than a direct subsidy.
Despite these powerful arguments, there are strong reasons to doubt
that tax incentives actually reduce transaction costs. For taxpayers who
have a network for obtaining information about direct subsidy programs,
the marginal costs of digesting information about a new subsidy are
probably no higher than the costs of assimilating similar information
about a tax incentive.2 "5 Moreover, if the government already dissemi-
nates information about direct grants through an existing communica-
tion channel and has pared the list of potential grant recipients, the
marginal costs to the government of disseminating information about a
new grant program through the same channel may very well be lower
than the costs of communicating information about a similar tax incen-
tive, to all taxpayers, through the annual tax return process. To meet
these objections, the benefits of certain tax incentives might be limited to
small businesses and middle-income taxpayers who generally lack net-
works for the assimilation of information about direct grant programs
and whose marginal costs of obtaining information about government
policies would consequently be lower when government intervention
takes the form of a tax incentive. 20 6
With this limitation on the scope of tax incentives, the marginal costs
associated with a recently-enacted tax incentive might be lower than the
costs of communicating and acquiring information about a comparable
direct-subsidy program. But limiting the benefits of a tax expenditure to
certain taxpayers may be hard to explain to taxpayers who are not the
beneficiaries of the incentive. It may increase taxpayer disaffection and
undermine confidence in the self-assessment system. Moreover, if the
government's goal in enacting a tax incentive is truly desirable, limiting
its scope to small businesses and middle-income taxpayers deprives the
government of the ability to affect the behavior of those large businesses
and upper-income taxpayers whose control over resources enables them
to have a proportionately greater effect in accomplishing the govern-
203. See id at 1011.
204. See id
205. Professor Zelinsky seems to accept this point since he advocates limiting certain
tax incentives to taxpayers whose contact with the government is primarily through the
annual tax return process. See id at 1011, 1033-34. See infra text accompanying notes
206-07.
206. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1034, 1037.
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ment's objectives. Although both of these objections to limiting incen-
tives to small businesses and middle-income taxpayers may be met by the
creation of a parallel direct subsidy program for other taxpayers, the
functioning of two programs simultaneously, each addressed to the same
government objective, may actually increase total transaction costs be-
yond the costs of a single, direct subsidy program. 20 7
In light of these considerations, the argument that the existing tax sys-
tem is a relatively efficient means of conveying information about re-
cently adopted government policies is at least questionable. Moreover,
by comparing the marginal costs of conveying this information through
the tax system and through direct subsidy programs, the argument fails
to address the more critical issue of whether the replacement of tax in-
centives with direct subsidy programs would reduce the overall transac-
tion costs of accomplishing government objectives. Even assuming that
the existing tax system is a resource that may profitably be exploited at
low marginal cost, the cost of maintaining that resource in the form of
fees paid to lawyers and accountants and salaries paid to government
officials is high, in part because of the plethora of tax incentives con-
tained within the current Code.20 s Thus, critics of tax expenditures are
likely to remain convinced that the repeal of tax incentives would reduce
the overall transaction costs of the tax system in an amount greater than
any possible savings in marginal transaction costs from using the existing
tax system, instead of direct subsidy programs, to convey information
about government policies.
4. Summary
The defenders of tax expenditures have made a major contribution by
broadening the debate over the efficiency of tax incentives. They have
explored the possibility that tax incentives may be used to remedy
sectoral inefficiencies or to compensate for externalities, and the possibil-
ity that tax incentives may be more efficient than direct subsidies in ac-
complishing government objectives. The preceding analysis reveals,
however, that the case for most tax incentives on efficiency grounds re-
207. Although Professor Zelinsky anticipates this objection, see id. at 1034, he never-
theless concludes his article by recommending that tax incentives "be designed for mid-
dle-income persons and small businesses" and that large corporations and high-income
families "participate in direct expenditure programs." See id. at 1037. In addressing any
single societal goal, adoption of this recommendation would seem to require the creation
of parallel tax expenditure and direct subsidy programs.
Of course, different government objectives may require the participation of different
segments of the population. If so, it may be possible, as Professor Zelinsky suggests, to
tailor the form of government intervention to suit the intended audience. See id. at 1033.
Whether this suggestion would lead to the adoption of many tax incentives seems doubt-
ful, however, because the participation of large corporations and upper-income taxpayers,
who have proportionately greater control over economic resources, may often be essential
in accomplishing the government's goal. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
208. See 1 Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 3; Gephardt & Wessel, supra note 180, at
907.
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mains dubious for several reasons: even those incentives that appear easy
to justify as cures for market failure may in fact cause misallocations of
societal resources; efficient tax incentives are more difficult to design than
direct subsidies; tax incentives are less likely to be subjected to rigorous
cost-benefit analysis than direct subsidies; the enactment of tax incentives
undermines a self-assessment system of taxation; and the transaction
costs generated by tax incentives are likely to be equal to or higher than
the costs associated with direct subsidy programs.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE 1986 ACT
A. The Major Features
In its basic design, the 1986 Act represents a series of trade-offs be-
tween tax reductions for certain taxpayers and tax increases for others." 9
Individual taxpayers receive an overall tax reduction, which is offset by
an approximately equal increase in taxes owed by corporations.21 With
respect to individuals, tax reduction takes primarily the form of a reduc-
tion in marginal tax rates and an increase in the standard deduction and
the personal exemption.211 The loss in revenue caused by the adoption of
these provisions is partly offset by: the repeal (or restriction) of certain
exclusions, deductions, and credits; the prevention of certain forms of
income-splitting for tax purposes; the elimination of the benefits of many
tax shelters; the repeal of income-averaging; and the strengthening of the
alternative minimum tax.212 With respect to corporations, tax reduction
takes the form of a reduction in marginal tax rates.2" 3 Taxes paid by
corporations will increase overall, however, because of the repeal (or re-
striction) of certain exclusions, deductions, and credits and because of
the replacement of the corporate minimum tax by a more potent alterna-
tive minimum tax. 214
B. Individual Taxpayers
1. Rate Reduction, Personal Exemption, Standard Deduction, and
Earned Income Credit
The centerpiece of the 1986 Act as it affects individual taxpayers is the
replacement of the old rate structure based on fifteen marginal tax brack-
209. Part II analyzes the 1986 Act in its fully effective form and ignores the many
transition rules adopted by Congress to delay the immediate impact of the tax changes
wrought by the Act. See e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a),
1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 149, I.R.C.
§ 469(1) (CCH 1986) (phase-in of "passive loss" restrictions).
210. See Conference Comm. Report, Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. Rep. No. 841,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-884 (1986).
211. See id. at 11-866 to -867.
212. See id. at 11-866 to -881.
213. See id at 11-871.
214. See id. at 11-866 to -881.
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ets with a new rate structure containing only two marginal rates (15%
and 28%)215 Although the maximum tax bracket declines from 50% to
28%, a large group of upper-middle-income taxpayers will be subject to
an effective marginal tax rate of 33% due to a phase-out of the benefits of
the 15% bracket and a phase-out of the personal exemptions when taxa-
ble income exceeds certain amounts.216 Tax relief for low- and middle-
income taxpayers includes an increase in the amount of the personal ex-
emption to $2,000,217 a more generous standard deduction ($5,000 for
married taxpayers filing jointly) replacing the zero bracket amount,218
and an increase in the amount (and future indexing for inflation) of the
earned income credit.219
2. Exclusion, Credits, and Deductions
To recoup in part the revenue losses caused by rate reduction and tax
relief for low- and middle-income individual taxpayers, the 1986 Act re-
peals or restricts a plethora of exclusions, credits, and deductions. With
limited exceptions, the exclusions for unemployment compensation 2
20
and for prizes and awards 221 are repealed; the partial exclusion for divi-
dends received by individual taxpayers is repealed; 222 and the exclusion
for scholarships is repealed for non-degree candidates and is generally
limited to tuition, fees, and books for degree candidates.223 The credit
for political contributions is repealed.224
Even more numerous are the changes affecting income tax deductions.
The deduction for state and local sales taxes has been repealed, 225 as has
the deduction for adoption expenses.226 The charitable deduction for
taxpayers who do not itemize has been allowed to expire at the end of
1986 in accordance with prior law.227 The deduction for personal inter-
est, other than interest on debt secured by the taxpayer's principal resi-
dence or second residence, has generally been eliminated.228 The floor on
deductible medical expenses has been increased from 5% to 7.5% of ad-
215. See I.R.C. § I (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
216. See id. § I(g).
217. See id. § 151(d)(1)(c).
218. See id. § 63(c)(2).
219. See id. § 32(a), (i).
220. See id. § 85.
221. See id. § 74.
222. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 612(a), 1986 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 166.
223. See I.R.C. § 117 (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
224. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 112(a), 1986 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 24.
225. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 134(a), 1986 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 32.
226. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 135(a), 1986 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 32.
227. See I.R.C. § 170(i)(4) (1982).
228. See id. § 163(h)(1) (West Spec. Pam. 1987). "Personal interest" is defined to ex-
clude interest incurred in connection with a trade or business, investment interest, inter-
[Vol. 55
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
justed gross income.Y 9 A floor of 2% of adjusted gross income has been
imposed on miscellaneous itemized deductions, including unreimbursed
employee business expenses and expenses for the production of income
and for tax advice.230 The deduction for business meals and entertain-
ment expenses is generally limited to 80% of cost231 with additional re-
strictions placed on the deduction for specific forms of business
entertainment.232 The expenses of travel as a form of education are gen-
erally nondeductible.233
By virtue of the repeal of the capital gains deduction,' long-term cap-
ital gains will be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income. The deduc-
tion for two-earner married couples235 and income-averaging236 have
both been repealed. The deduction for contributions to Individual Retire-
ment Accounts has been eliminated (or limited) for certain taxpayers237
and the amount of the maximum deduction for contributions to so-called
"section 401k plans" has been reduced from $30,000 to S7,000
annually.238
3. Tax Shelters
Various provisions of the 1986 Act that apply generally to all invest-
ments also curtail two of the advantages of tax shelters-rate conversion
and deferral. Repeal of the capital gains deduction2 39 prevents taxpayers
from converting ordinary income into capital gain. Repeal (or restric-
tion) of various deductions or credits240 precludes investors in certain
tax-shelters from deferring tax on income. The advantages of both defer-
ral and leveraging-the third primary benefit of tax shelters-are re-
duced by specific provisions directed against tax-shelter abuses, including
the following: the "at-risk" rules have been extended to apply to most
real estate investments;241 restrictions have been placed on the deductibil-
est on passive investment activities, interest on debt secured by a principal or second
residence, and interest payable on certain estate tax deficiencies. See id. § 163(h)(2).
229. See id § 213(a).
230. See id. § 67(a), (b).
231. See id § 274(n).
232. See, .g., id. § 274Q)(2) (limitations placed on amount deductible for entertain-
ment tickets and skybox rentals).
233. See id § 274(m)(2).
234. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(a), 1986 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 132.
235. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 13 1(a), 1986 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 29.
236. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 141(a), 1986 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 33.
237. See I.R.C. § 219(g) OVest Spec. Pam. 1987).
238. See id. § 402(g)(1).
239. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
241. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 503(a), 1986 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 159 (repeal of exception for most
real estate from at-risk rules).
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ity of passive investment losses;242 and the deduction for investment in-
terest has generally been limited to the amount of net investment
income.243
4. Income-Splitting
The 1986 Act limits the opportunities for shifting income from high-
to low-bracket taxpayers in two primary ways. Under pre-1986 law, a
taxpayer could shift income to a trust (or to its beneficiaries) by placing
income-producing property in the trust and retaining a reversionary in-
terest in the corpus after ten years (a so-called "Clifford Trust").2" To
eliminate this tax advantage, the 1986 Act generally taxes income of a
trust to the grantor if the grantor or the grantor's spouse has a reversion-
ary interest exceeding 5% of the value of the trust in either the corpus or
income of the trust.24 5 Under pre-1986 law, income on property trans-
ferred to children was taxable to the child at his or her marginal tax
rate.246 Under the 1986 Act, unearned income of a child under fourteen
years of age in excess of $500 will generally be taxed to the child as if the
income had been received by the child's parents, 247 which reduces the
incentive to transfer income-producing property to a child to take advan-
tage of the child's lower marginal tax bracket.
5. Fringe Benefits
Aside from tightening and unifying the rule requiring non-discrimina-
tion among employees,248 the 1986 Act makes few changes in the taxa-
tion of fringe benefits. Thus, the exclusions for up to $50,000 of group-
term life insurance,249 for $5,000 of employee death benefits, 250 for cafe-
teria plans, 25 1 for employer-provided health insurance, 2 2 and for the
242. See I.R.C. § 469 (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
243. See id. § 163(d)(1).
244. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940) (short-term trust held ineffec-
tive to shift income from grantor). After the Clifford case was decided, Congress enacted
specific statutory provisions designed to prevent income-splitting. See I.R.C. §§ 671-77
(1982) (amended 1986). But the provisions did not succeed in preventing income-split-
ting by the creation of trusts in which grantors would retain a reversionary interest after
ten years. See id. § 673(a) (amended 1986). These trusts were frequently referred to as
"Clifford Trusts." See, e.g., President's Proposals, supra note 2, at 88.
245. See I.R.C. §§ 672(e), 673(a) (West Spec. Pam. 1987). There is a limited exception
for a trust in which the grantor or the grantor's spouse has a reversionary interest that
takes effect only upon the death of a beneficiary before the age of 21 who is a lineal
descendant of the grantor and who holds all the present interests in the trust. See. id.
§ 673(b).
246. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1282-83.
247. See I.R.C. § 1(i) (West Spec. Pam. 1987). But since the child is entitled to a $500
standard deduction, a total of $1,000 of unearned income may be shielded from tax at the
parent's marginal rate. See id. § 63(c)(5).
248. See id. § 89.
249. See id. § 79(a) (1982).
250. See id. § 101(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
251. See id. § 125 (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
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rental value of parsonages remain effective.253 Although the exclusion
for dependent care assistance expenses has been limited to $5,000 per
year,254 the exclusions for educational assistance" 5 and for group legal
services plans,2" 6 which were due to expire at the end of 1985, have been
extended through 1987. The exclusion for employer-provided commuta-
tion has been allowed to expire at the end of 1985.11
6. Alternative Minimum Tax
In addressing many of the remaining preferences available to individ-
ual taxpayers, the 1986 Act strengthens generally the alternative mini-
mum tax on items of tax-preference income.258 First, the tax rate on
alternative minimum taxable income increases from 20% to 21% for tax-
payers other than corporations." 9 Second, the exemption from the alter-
native minimum tax for $40,000 of preference income is phased out when
alternative minimum taxable income exceeds certain levels. 2" Third, the
definition of alternative minimum taxable income is broadened to include
(among other items) tax-exempt interest on newly-issued private activity
bonds261 and untaxed appreciation on charitable contributions of appre-
ciated property.2 62 Fourth, the amount of intangible drilling costs treated
as alternative minimum taxable income is increased.263 Fifth, two meth-
ods of accounting that are permissible in computing income for regular
tax purposes-the completed contract method and the installment sales
method-may not be used for the purpose of computing alternative taxa-
264ble income.
252. See id § 105(b), (c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
253. See id § 107 (1982).
254. See id § 129(a)(2) (West Spec. Pare. 1987).
255. See id § 127(d).
256. See id § 120(e).
257. See id § 124(e) (1982).
258. See infra text accompanying notes 259-64.
The 1986 Act, however, liberalizes the tax treatment of preference income in one re-
spect. A taxpayer who has paid, in any taxable year, an alternative minimum tax that is
attributable to certain types of preference income is entitled, in subsequent taxable years,
to a tax credit in the amount of the prior alternative minimum tax paid. The credit is
limited to the excess of the taxpayer's regular tax liability over the "tentative minimum
tax" in the subsequent year. See I.R.C. § 53 (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
Because the repeal of tax preferences on certain items of income now subjects that
income to full taxation, the income is no longer treated as a preference for purposes of
computing alternative minimum taxable income. See, eg., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, § 301(a), 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News Special Pamphlet No.
9A (100 Stat.) 132 (repeal of the capital gains deduction); cf. I.RC. § 57(a)(9)(A) (1982)
(capital gains deduction treated as item of tax preference) (repealed 1986).
259. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A) (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
260. See id § 55(d)(3).
261. See id § 57(a)(5).
262. See id § 57(a)(6).
263. See id § 57(a)(2).
264. See id § 56(a)(3), (6). Since liability under the alternative minimum tax is the
greater of (1) 21% of alternative minimum taxable income or (2) the regular tax owed,





As with individual taxpayers, corporations benefit from the elimina-
tion of tax brackets and from rate reduction under the 1986 Act. In
place of a five-step corporate rate structure, the 1986 Act contains only
three marginal tax brackets, with the highest corporate tax rate declining
from 46% to 34%.265
2. Exclusions, Credits, and Deductions
To compensate for the losses in revenue caused by individual income
tax reduction and by corporate rate reduction, the 1986 Act repeals (or
restricts) a host of exclusions, deductions, and credits primarily used
by corporate taxpayers.266 The Investment Tax Credit has been re-
pealed267 and the amount of other, less costly, credits has been reduced
compared to pre-1986 law.268 The benefits of ACRS depreciation for real
estate have been substantially reduced by lengthening the periods over
which real estate may be depreciated. 269 The depreciation periods for
certain other assets have also been extended,2 70 but, for some of these, the
disadvantages of longer depreciation periods have been offset by a faster
rate of depreciation. 7 1 Provisions of the 1986 Act increase the tax liabil-
ity of specific industries by repealing (or restricting) the amortization of
certain costs 272 or by recapturing as income certain prior tax benefits. 273
The amount of the corporate dividends-received deduction has been
reduced from 85% to 80%.274 Pursuant to a statutory repeal of the Gen-
eral Utilities doctrine,275 a corporation is now generally subject to a tax
methods in computing alternative minimum taxable income is to increase the potential
amount of alternative minimum tax liability.
265. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
266. See infra text accompanying notes 267-76.
267. See I.R.C. § 49(a) (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
268. See, e.g., id. § 46(b)(4)(A) (credit for building rehabilitation costs reduced to
either 20% or 10%).
269. See id. § 168(c) (depreciation period for most rental real estate either 27.5 or 31.5
years).
270. See, e.g., id. § 168(e)(3)(B)(i) (recovery period for automobile or light truck ex-
tended from 3 to 5 years).
271. See id. § 168(b)(1)(A) (depreciation method for certain property changed to
200% declining balance from 150% declining balance).
272. See, eg., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 242(a), 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 97 (repeal of amortization of
railroad grading and tunnel bores).
273. See I.R.C. § 1254 (West Spec. Pam. 1987) (tightening of the recapture provision
for oil and gas and hard minerals).
274. See id. § 243(a)(1).
275. See General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935)
(corporation realizes no income (or loss) upon distribution of assets to shareholders). As
applied to the distribution or sale of assets in connection with the complete liquidation of
a corporation, the General Utilities rule was codified in I.R.C. §§ 336(a), 337(b) (1982)
(amended 1986). There were, however, limited statutory exceptions. See id. § 336(b)
[Vol. 55
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
at the corporate level on gains on property distributed to shareholders in
liquidation of the corporation.
2 76
3. Alternative Minimum Tax
The 1986 Act makes corporations subject to an alternative minimum
tax, which replaces the prior and less potent corporate minimum tax.
The rate of the alternative minimum tax is 20%277 compared with 15%
for the corporate minimum tax.278 The amount of preference income
subject to the minimum tax is no longer reduced by the amount of regu-
lar taxes paid.279 Instead, corporations are given an exemption for the
first $40,000 of alternative minimum taxable income, but the exemption
is phased out when alternative minimum taxable income exceeds
$150,000.280 The definition of alternative minimum taxable income is
broadened to include many of the additions to alternative minimum taxa-
ble income discussed earlier in connection with individual taxpayers.
281
Corporations are also now subject to a provision that treats as alternative
minimum taxable income a percentage of the excess of the corporation's
"adjusted net book income" (after 1989, "adjusted current earnings")
over its alternative minimum taxable income, computed without regard
to this adjustment.282
III. EVALUATION OF THE 1986 ACT
My earlier article set forth and analyzed criteria for a rational federal
income tax policy and measured the President's proposals for tax reform
against those criteria.28 3 In evaluating the 1986 Act as it affects individ-
ual income taxpayers, this Part will draw both on the analysis of the
criteria of federal tax policy contained in the earlier article and on the
discussion of equity and efficiency in Part I of this Article.2
(amended 1986) (gain recognized to corporation on distribution in liquidation of certain
LIFO inventory).
276. See I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982) (amended 1986).
277. See id § 55(a), (b)(1)(A).
278. See id § 56(a).
279. See id § 56(a)(2).
280. See id § 55(d)(2), (d)(3)(A) (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 261-64.
282. See I.R.C. § 56(c), (f), (g) (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
283. See generally Yorio I, supra note 4.
284. For a fuller exposition and analysis of the criteria of federal income tax policy, see
Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 567 (1965); Yorio I, at
1256-64.
Two of the criteria of tax policy explored in my earlier article, adequacy and economic
growth, will not receive detailed analysis here. Because the 1986 Act is expected to raise
as much revenue as its predecessor, the requirements of the adequacy criterion appear to
have been met, at least in comparison with prior law. See Conference Comm. Report,
Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-884 (1986). But see
Levin, The Nation's No. 1 Priority, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1986, § 4, at 21, col. 2 (article by
Sen. Levin contending that revenue neutrality is not adequate in light of budget deficit).




The 1986 Act simplifies the income tax system in a number of impor-
tant respects. The increases in the amount of the standard deduction and
of the personal exemption will remove large numbers of taxpayers from
the tax rolls entirely, thereby reducing the costs of taxpayer compliance
and government administration of the law.285 By repealing the deduc-
tion for sales taxes, increasing the floor on deductible medical expenses,
imposing a floor on the deduction for miscellaneous expenses, and by
increasing the standard deduction, the 1986 Act will reduce the number
of taxpayers who itemize their personal deductions. Since itemizing de-
ductions increases costs for both taxpayers and government, the effect
will be to reduce the overall transaction costs of the tax system.286
The criterion of simplicity is well served by the provisions of the 1986
Act that reduce the incentive of taxpayers to engage in planning to mini-
mize income tax liability. Foremost among these provisions is the de-
cline in the highest marginal tax rate from 50% to 28%, which reduces
the rewards of tax planning for high-income taxpayers287 and made pos-
sible the repeal of the complex income-averaging provisions of the pre-
1986 Code.288 The repeal of the capital gains deduction removes from
the Code what was perhaps its single most complicating feature,289
thereby avoiding the transaction costs of taxpayer attempts to convert
ordinary income deductions into capital gains and generally sparing the
government the costs of having to distinguish, on audit and in litigation,
between ordinary income and capital gain.2 90 The transaction costs of
planning by taxpayers will also be reduced by those provisions of the
1986 Act that curtail the benefits of tax shelters, that eliminate the ad-
vantages of certain income-splitting techniques, and that repeal a number
of exclusions, deductions, and credits available under prior law to indi-
mists vary widely. Some economists predict that growth will contract because of the
repeal or restriction of certain tax incentives. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1986, at D5,
col. I (comments of economist M. Weidenbaum); Think Tank Says Adverse Impact of
Senate Bill Could be Dampened by Easy Money, 104 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at LL-I
(May 30, 1986) (comments of economists J. Prakken, L. Meyer, and C. Varvares). At
least one economist believes that the gross national product will increase because of the
lower tax rate and fewer economic distortions. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 19, 1986, at
D5, col. 1 (comments of economist R. Gough).
285. See President's Proposals, supra note 2, at 6-7; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1268.
286. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1268; New IRS Commissioner Gibbs Sees Tax Com-
pliance Benefits from Overhaul Bill, 176 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at K-2 (Sept. 11, 1986)
(comments of I.R.S. Commissioner Gibbs that the 1986 Act will reduce the number of
taxpayers who itemize).
287. See Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 417, 430-35 (1952); Yorio II, supra note 197, at 50-51.
288. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 141(a) 1986 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News Special Pamphlet No. 9A (100 Stat.) 33.
289. See Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 4 (1974).
290. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1269-70. The distinction between capital gain or loss,
however, remains important in certain circumstances. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1211 (CCH
1986) (limitation on the deductibility of capital losses).
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vidual income taxpayers.2 9
Although the cumulative effect of these provisions will be to simplify
the tax system and thereby reduce transaction costs, there are numerous
other provisions of the 1986 Act that are virtually certain to complicate
the tax system from the standpoints of both taxpayer compliance and
government administration of the Code. In many cases, the added com-
plexity may be justified by tax policy criteria that conflict with the goal of
simplicity.292 In placing limitations on the deductibility of passive invest-
ment losses, for example, Congress enacted a statutory provision of con-
siderable complexity,29 which may be defended only by invoking the
competing tax policy criteria of equity and economic neutrality.219 Simi-
larly, one provision of the 1986 Act, designed to reduce the advantages of
income-splitting between parents and children, adds complexity to the
Code, 95 but may be justified as a way of eliminating the previous ineq-
uity of allowing holders of capital a tax advantage (the ability to shift
income) denied to other taxpayers.29 6 Other provisions of the 1986 Act
complicate the Code without counterbalancing tax policy benefits. The
phase-out of the benefits of the 15% tax bracket and of the personal ex-
emption for taxpayers with income above a certain level,297 for example,
adds complexity to the Code that might have been avoided by enacting a
slightly higher maximum tax bracket or by adding a third tax bracket to
the current two-bracket schedule.
291. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1268-69.
292. For an attempt to make the choice between competing tax policy criteria a ra-
tional one, see Sneed, supra note 284, at 601-04; see also Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1264
(discussing the compatibility of tax policy criteria).
Part of the complexity and tax planning activity caused by the 1986 Act, at least in the
short run, is the result of the need for taxpayers to adjust to sweeping tax changes. See
Gutfeld, IRS Predicts Small Business Will Cheat Less, Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1986, at 31, col.
3 (comments of tax accountant L. Nad). But other provisions of the 1986 Act may per-
manently increase the level of tax planning by certain taxpayers. See Gottschalk, Lenders
Push Homeowners to Refinance but Tax Bill can Make Loans More Costly, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 17, 1986, at 33, col. 4 (discussion of tax planning to avoid restrictions on the deduct-
ibility of personal interest); Berton, Minimum Tax Proposal Touches off Scramble, Wall
St. J., Sept. 10, 1986, at 6, col. 1 (analysis of tax planning to avoid the impact of the
corporate alternative minimum tax).
293. See I.RC. § 469 (vest Spec. Pam. 1987).
294. See infra text accompanying notes 308-09, 311.
295. To prevent holders of capital from transferring income-producing property to
children under 14 years of age and thereby getting the benefit of taxation of the income at
the child's marginal tax bracket, the 1986 Act taxes the child's income as if it had been
received by the parent. See I.R.C. § l(i) (West Spec. Pane. 1987). See supra text accom-
panying notes 246-47. Although this provision can be justified as a method of reducing
tax inequity between holders of capital and other taxpayers, it undeniably complicates tax
reporting and compliance for those taxpayers affected.
296. See M. Chirelstein, supra note 162, at 180-82; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1282-83.




Because the contents of the fairness criterion298 may vary from indi-
vidual to individual depending on one's subjective view of the proper
level of progression in an income tax,299 it is impossible to reach a defini-
tive judgment about the 1986 Act from the standpoint of tax fairness.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the 1986 Act probably
does not reduce the level of progressivity of the federal income tax de-
spite the fact that the highest tax bracket has declined from 50% to
2 8 %.30o Although the decline in the top tax bracket will reduce the aver-
age rate of tax for many upper-income taxpayers, marginal tax rate re-
duction is more than offset for other upper-income taxpayers by the
repeal (or restriction) of exclusions, deductions, and credits, the strength-
ening of the alternative minimum tax, the repeal of the capital gains de-
duction, and the restrictions placed on income-splitting and on tax
shelters.3"1 Although upper-income taxpayers benefit from generally
greater tax savings in absolute dollar amounts, the percentage reduction
in tax burdens under the 1986 Act is greater for low- and middle-income
taxpayers,30 2 primarily because of the large increases in the amount of
the standard deduction and of the personal exemption.3 °3 Indeed, it is
arguable that, by levying higher taxes on corporations to finance individ-
ual rate reduction, the 1986 Act actually increases the progressivity of
the tax system overall3° because, at least in the short run, corporate
298. The fairness criterion refers to the proper distribution of the tax burden across
different income levels and specifically to the proper level of progressivity in an income
tax. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1260-61. The criterion of equity, by contrast, demands
that taxpayers with the same level of income pay the same amount of tax. See supra note
72.
299. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1260-61. See generally Blum & Kalven, supra note
287 (best analysis of the arguments for and against progressive taxation).
300. This is supported by figures released by the Joint Committee on Taxation. See
Report of Joint Committee on Taxation, 33 Tax Notes 73 (1986). For 1988, the average
income tax rate for taxpayers with income below $10,000 declines from 1.6% under pre-
1986 law to 0.5%; for taxpayers with income between $10,000 and $20,000, the rate
declines from 5.7% to 4.4%; for taxpayers with income between $100,000 and $200,000,
the rate declines from 19.3% to 18.9%; for taxpayers whose income exceeds $200,000,
the rate declines from 22.8% to 22.3%. See id. at 74; see also Pear, Tax System to Remain
Progressive, Experts Say, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at B 11, col. 1 (new tax system "just
about as progressive" as prior law).
301. Among taxpayers whose income exceeds $200,000, 311,000 will receive a tax in-
crease in 1988 compared to 393,000 who will benefit from a tax decrease. See Report of
Joint Committee on Taxation, 33 Tax Notes 73, 74 (1986).
302. For taxpayers with income below $10,000, the reduction in tax liability in abso-
lute dollars is $39; for taxpayers with income between $10,000 and $20,000, the reduction
is $200; for taxpayers with income between $100,000 and $200,000, the reduction is $612;
for taxpayers whose income exceeds $200,000, the reduction is $3,362. See id. at 74. But
the percentage reduction is far greater for lower-income taxpayers: income below
$10,000, 65.1%; income between $10,000 and $20,000, 22.3%; income between $100,000
and $200,000, 2.2%; income above $200,000, 2.4%. See id. at 73.
303. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
304. The 1986 Act may also increase the overall progressivity of combined federal,
state, and local taxes by eliminating the deduction for state and local sales taxes if the
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The 1986 Act takes major steps to improve the equity of the federal
income tax system by repealing (or restricting) a host of tax preferences
previously available to holders of capital, including most importantly the
capital gains deduction, the Investment Tax Credit, ACRS depreciation
on real estate, tax-shelter leveraging, and income-splitting.3°s Together
with the strengthening of the alternative minimum tax,3 0 7 these provi-
sions not only remove (or mitigate) some of the major causes of tax ineq-
uity, but also increase indirectly the rate of implicit tax on those
substitute preferences left untouched by tax reform.30 8 With an increase
in the implicit tax, tax inequity between investors in tax preferences and
other taxpayers is reduced. 9 Moreover, the decline in marginal tax rates
contained in the 1986 Act has the effect of reducing tax inequity by re-
ducing the surplus enjoyed by those taxpayers who are able to take ad-
vantage of the preferences remaining in the Code.31 °
D. Economic Neutrality
As discussed in Part I, preferential tax treatment of consumption or
production activities may distort resource allocation by overstimulating
demand or supply of the tax-preferred good or service. The 1986 Act
eliminates (or minimizes) tax incentives offered to a host of activities
under the pre-1986 Code. On the consumption side, the incentive to
purchase on credit and to incur certain other personal expenses is re-
duced by restrictions imposed on the deductibility of interest and other
personal expenses;311 the incentive to incur business meal and entertain-
ment expenses is reduced by limitations and restrictions imposed on the
deductibility of those expenses;312 the incentive to defer current con-
effect of repeal of this deduction will be to induce state and local governments to turn
away from the sales tax as a source of revenue, see infra text accompanying note 385,
since sales taxes are generally regarded as regressive. See, e.g., Murray, Many States
Target Wealthy to Bear Tax Burden or New U.S. Law Forces Them to Revamp Codes,
Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 50, col. 1.
305. See Ballentine, Where is the Income Tax Rationale for the Shift to Higher Corpo-
rate Taxes?, 30 Tax Notes 443, 445-46 (1986); see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at
B11, col. 1 (corporate tax "progressively distributed").
306. See supra text accompanying notes 234, 241-43, 245-47, 267-69.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 258-64.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 225-29, 233.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 231-32 and accompanying text. For estimates
of the distortion in resource allocation caused by the business meals and entertainment
deduction, see Clotfelter, Tax-Induced Distortions and the Business-Pleasure Borderline,
73 Am. Econ. Rev. 1053, 1064 (1983).
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sumption by contributing to IRAs or to "section 401k" plans is reduced
by restrictions placed on both.313
On the production side, the 1986 Act's effect on resource allocation is
likely to be even more dramatic. The reduction in marginal tax rates
may make taxpayers less inclined to substitute leisure for work.a 14 In
making investment decisions, taxpayers will be less likely to pursue tax
objectives both because of lower marginal tax rates and because of the
elimination (or restriction) of various tax preferences. 315 Repeal of the
capital gains deduction reduces the incentive to invest in high-growth,
low-income assets;316 repeal of the Investment Tax Credit reduces the
incentive to invest in machinery and equipment;3 7 reducing the benefits
of ACRS depreciation for real estate will shift resources into other indus-
tries;31 8 restrictions on tax shelters, particularly on real estate invest-
ments, will have a similar effect;3 19 and reducing the tax benefits available
to certain industries, in part by strengthening the alternative minimum
tax,32° will make it easier for other industries to attract resources for
their production activities.321 In the absence of convincing evidence that
these tax incentives operated generally to remedy market failures,322 the
effect of their repeal is likely to promote efficiency by removing distor-
tions in resource-allocation caused by the pre-1986 Code.323
313. See supra text accompanying notes 237-38.
314. See R. Posner, supra note 108, at 472-73 (analysis of possible inefficiency of tax
rule leading to substitution of leisure for work); Blum & Kalven, supra note 287, at 437-
38 (high marginal rates may deter the most productive citizens from work).
315. For evidence that the 1986 Act will reduce the discrepancies in effective tax rates
on various investment assets, see Sheppard, Economists Analyze the 1986 Act's Corporate
Tax Shift, 34 Tax Notes 536, 537 (1987).
316. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1284; cf R. Posner, supra note 108, at 470 (capital
gains deduction encourages investment in assets producing low current income).
317. See Tax-Related Economic Development, 170 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at LL-1
(Sept. 3, 1986) (Conference Board prediction that the repeal of the Investment Tax Credit
will affect investment in machinery); Hulten, The Proposal Strikes a Fair Balance, N.Y.
Times, June 16, 1985, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (article by economist C. Hulten on distortion
caused by Investment Tax Credit).
318. Cf Hendershott, supra note 88, at 1108-09 (1986) (analysis of distortions caused
by real estate tax incentives); Johnson, Error in the Name of Interest, 30 Tax Notes 451,
454 (1986) (ACRS tax preference leads to investments that "would not be made without
the tax benefits"). See generally Sheppard, Silicon Chips and Stock Gains: Making Sense
of Capital Gains Exclusion Repeal, 31 Tax Notes 647, 650 (1986) (quoting comment of
economist J. Makin that the 1986 Act will improve resource allocation).
319. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1287-88.
320. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 57(a)(2) (West Spec. Pam. 1987) (increase in the amount of
intangible drilling costs treated as alternative minimum taxable income).
321. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1288.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 132-65.
323. There are numerous studies that demonstrate the distortions caused by the invest-
ment tax incentives provided by the pre-1986 Code. See, e.g., Auerbach, The New Eco-
nomics of Accelerated Depreciation, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 1327, 1345-50 (1982) (the investment
stimulus of ACRS "is very distortionary in its distribution across different assets");
Graetz & McDowell, Tax Reform 1985: The Quest for a Fairer, More Efficient and Sim-
pler Income Tax, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 5, 17-18 (1984) (incentives encourage "the
inefficient allocation of resources"); Hendershott, supra note 88, at 1107-08 (incentives
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IV. AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE REFORM
With change as complex and comprehensive as that wrought by the
1986 Act, it is almost inevitable that further legislation will be required to
address problems that Congress either did not anticipate or chose to ig-
nore in its desire to pass a tax reform act before the 1986 elections.324
The prospect of additional tax legislation is enhanced also by the per-
ceived need to reduce the federal deficit and by the view of some legisla-
tors and economists that revenue-raising is an appropriate response, if
only partial, to the deficit dilemma.325 Then, too, the tax preferences
surviving in the Code despite the 1986 Act create the potential for a re-
newed attack on the tax system by either the executive or the legislative
branch under the banner of tax reform.326 Indeed, the trumpets of battle
have already sounded three discordant themes. Some congressmen be-
lieve that marginal tax rates should increase (or at least not be allowed to
decline in accord with the 1986 Act) as a means of closing the deficit
gap;327 others endorse some sort of consumption tax to help accomplish
the same goal;328 still others support the reenactment of certain tax in-
tilt the playing field in favor of certain industries); Jorgenson & Sullivan, Reforming Capi-
tal Recovery under the Corporate Income Tax, 12 Tax Notes 1397, 1397 (1981) (incentives
cause "serious misallocation of capital").
For evidence that the 1986 Act will remove (or reduce) many of these distortions, see
Sheppard, supra note 315, at 536-37.
324. Legislators may try to make further substantive changes in the Code when consid-
ering the technical amendments needed to correct errors or oversights in the 1986 Act.
See, e.g., Hanlon, supra note 3, at 134; ESOPS: Senate Tax Writers Warn of Retroactive
Changes to Estate Tax Break, Hint at Repeal, 23 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-3 to G-5
(Feb. 5, 1987).
325. See. e.g., Levin, The Nation's No. 1 Priority, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1986, at sec. 4,
p. 21, col. 2 (article by Sen. Levin); Wright, The Subversive Federal Debt, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 22, 1987, at A27, col. 1 (article by Rep. J. Wright, Speaker of the House); N.Y.
Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at B 11, col. 1 (comments of Rep. Rostenkowski).
326. See Hanlon, supra note 324, at 134 (support of Sen. B. Packwood for base-broad-
ening rather than rate increases to reduce deficit). For a list of investment preferences
that may be the targets of future legislation, see U.S. Budget: Extending 1987 Tax Rates
for One Year Would Raise $16.8 Billion in FY 1988, CBO Estimates, 23 Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), at LL-5 to 6 (Feb. 5, 1987) (report of Congressional Budget Office). See also
infra text accompanying notes 334-421 (proposals for repealing (or restricting) individual
income tax preferences).
327. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (proposal by Rep. J. Wright,
Speaker of the House, to delay rate reduction); N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at Bl 1, col. 1
(proposal by Rep. D. Rostenkowski to raise rates to generate new revenues). To raise
revenues through an income tax increase, Congress "might abolish more deductions and
other tax preferences" instead of raising marginal tax rates. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17,
1986, at D2, col. 4 (proposal by Sen. B. Packwood).
328. See e.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 26, col. 5 (article by Rep. N. Gingrich
proposing value-added tax); 171 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-3 (Sept. 4, 1986) (com-
ments of Sen. Durenberger endorsing consumption tax); see also Bierman & Bierman,
Tax Reform for the Number One Economic Problem in 1987, 34 Tax Notes 499, 501
(1987) (consumption tax endorsed to increase rate of savings). Instead of imposing a
consumption tax or increasing income taxes, Congress might increase excise taxes to raise
revenue. See U.S. Budget" Ways-Means Committee Reconsiders Menu of Excise Taxes to
Meet New Deficit-Cutting Target, 177 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at LL-6 to LL-7 (Sept. 12,
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centives that were repealed (or restricted) by the 1986 Act.32 9
The analysis in Part I of this Article demonstrates, however, that in-
creasing marginal tax rates or adding tax incentives to the Code will un-
dermine the best features of the 1986 Act from the standpoints of both
equity and efficiency. Failure to allow tax rates to decline as provided by
the 1986 Act will mean that taxpayers who are able to utilize the remain-
ing preferences in the Code will enjoy a greater surplus from pursuing
the preferences, thus exacerbating tax inequity between those and other
taxpayers.330 Higher marginal tax rates will also increase transaction
costs by inducing taxpayers to engage in costly tax planning and will
distort resource-allocation by encouraging tax-motivated, but otherwise
relatively unproductive, investments. 33 Equity and efficiency will suffer,
too, if Congress reverses the judgment of the 1986 Act by reenacting tax
incentives. Not only does any new preference generate its own inequity
and distortion, but each preference added to the Code reduces demand
for existing, substitute preferences.332 As demand for an existing prefer-
ence declines, the surplus enjoyed by pursuing the preference increases
and the implicit tax on the preference decreases.333 As a consequence,
both tax inequity and distortions in resource-allocation are likely to be
exacerbated.
Although the linchpins of the 1986 Act, rate reduction and the repeal
(or restriction) of tax preferences, merit continued legislative support, a
number of Code provisions should be reconsidered by Congress from the
perspectives of equity and efficiency. The remainder of this Article
makes several recommendations for reform in three areas of concern to
individual income taxpayers: exclusions from gross income, personal de-
ductions, and capital gains. The proposed reforms, if enacted, will im-
1986) (Ways and Means Committee considering menu of excise tax increases to reduce
deficit). See generally Hanlon & Teuber, Pay Me Now, Pay Me Later: Congress Looks at
Revenue Options, 32 Tax Notes 1042 (1986) (survey of the various revenue options avail-
able to Congress).
Because the analysis in Parts I through III of this Article has been limited almost
entirely to federal income tax policy, Part IV will not consider proposals to adopt a value-
added or other consumption-type tax.
329. See, e.g., Energy: Industry Experts Back Tax Changes to Aid Domestic Oil Produ-
cers, 20 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-2 (Feb. 2, 1987) (bill introduced by Sens. D. Boren
and J. Bingaman to repeal intangible drilling costs recapture rule); Tax Legislation: Tax
Writers Will Fight New Transition Rules to Tax Overhaul Law, Aides Say, 189 Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA), at G-3 (Sept. 30, 1986) (proposal by Sen. L. Bentsen to exempt existing tax
shelters from passive loss limitations); see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 1
(proposal by 0. Bowen, Sec'y of Health and Human Services, to provide additional tax
subsidies for health insurance).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 287, 314-16.
332. The argument in the text is simply the converse of the point demonstrated earlier
that the repeal of any tax preference increases demand for substitute preferences. See
supra notes 55, 73-74 and accompanying text.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 73-74.
[Vol. 55
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
prove both the equity and efficiency of the tax system and will provide
additional revenues to support a further decline in marginal tax rates.
A. Exclusions from Gross Income
My earlier article criticized a number of exclusions from gross income
for violating the criterion of tax equity and for distorting the allocation of
resources in society.33 4 Even if the magnitude of the inequities and dis-
tortions caused by these provisions is less as a consequence of the 1986
Act,335 criticism of several of the exclusions on the grounds of equity and
efficiency remains valid.
The exclusion for income earned by certain life insurance policies-
sometimes referred to as "inside build-up" 336---enables purchasers of
these policies to obtain the advantages of deferring tax on the income as
it accrues and of borrowing tax-free against the accrued income. 337 Fur-
ther, the inside build-up entirely escapes taxation upon death, thereby
converting the deferral advantage into complete exemption from tax.338
Supporters of the exclusion have argued that inside build-up is analogous
to unrealized capital appreciation,33 9 which also provides tax benefits in
the form of deferral, 3 ° tax-free borrowing against appreciation,1" and
possible exemption from income tax at death.342 For reasons discussed
in my earlier article34 3 and elaborated on by other critics of the exclu-
sion,3 1 the analogy of inside build-up to unrealized capital appreciation
is unconvincing. Because the exclusion causes inequity between insur-
334. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1270-73.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 308-10.
336. See; eg., President's Proposals, supra note 2, at 254-57; Wall St. J., June 17, 1985,
at 1, col. 6.
337. See Brannon, Taxation of Inside Buildup on Life Insurance Policies-Interim Re-
port or Post-Mortem?, 31 Tax Notes 735, 736 (1986); Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1271.
338. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1271.
339. See; eg., 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Incoma Estates and Gifts, 1 12.2.1, at
12-5 (1981) [hereinafter Bittker I]. Professor Bittker has also argued that taxing inside
build-up would be a palliative, not a corrective, unless mortality gains and losses were
also recognized for tax purposes. See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925, 944 (1967). One response to this objection is
that partial reform reducing the degree of inequity and inefficiency is preferable to no
reform at all in this area. Cf Brannon, supra note 337, at 739 (proposal to tax inside
build-up upon realization or at death). The objection may also be met by taxing mortal-
ity gains (and losses). Cf I.RC. § 72(b) (West Spec. Pam. 1987) (mortality gains and
losses on annuities recognized for tax purposes).
340. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211 (1920) (unrealized gains not taxable
as income).
341. See Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1952)
(borrowing against unrealized appreciation does not subject taxpayer to tax on accrued
gain).
342. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1982) (basis of inherited property is fair market value at
death).
343. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1271-72.
344. See Brannon, supra note 337, at 736-37; see also Shakow, Taxation Without Reali-
zation: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1138 (1986) (taxation
of inside build-up would be "feasible").
1987]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ance policyholders and other taxpayers and distorts resource-allocation
by diverting investment funds into life insurance,345 the exclusion should
be repealed.
The exclusion for interest on state and local government bonds pro-
vides a tax benefit to holders of capital who are able to invest in these
bonds that is unavailable to other taxpayers.346 Moreover, the evidence
is convincing that as a subsidy to state and local governments, the ex-
emption for interest on these bonds is technically inefficient, costing the
federal government a greater amount in lost revenues than the benefit
obtained by local governments in the form of lower interest on their debt
instruments.347 Outright repeal of the exclusion is unlikely because the
subsidy to local governments is substantial, 348 but by subjecting the inter-
est on certain private-activity bonds to the alternative minimum tax,34 9
the 1986 Act provides a wedge for subjecting all state and local govern-
ment bond interest to the alternative minimum tax. 350
The Treasury Report to the President proposed the repeal (or restric-
tion) of exclusions for a host of fringe benefits provided under the pre-
1986 Code.3 1  The President pared considerably the list of fringe benefits
targeted for repeal in his tax reform proposals.352 In passing the 1986
Act, Congress allowed the exclusions for all but a few fringe benefits to
survive intact.353
From the perspective of equity, favorable tax treatment of fringe bene-
fits might be tolerable if these benefits were equally available to all tax-
payers3 4 or if the market completely adjusted for the tax preferences by
345. See Brannon, supra note 337, at 735-36; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1272.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
347. See sources cited supra note 117.
348. Cf Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 Mich. L. Rev.
1099, 1122 (1973) (repeal of interest exclusion "not in the cards without a substantial
federal subsidy"). Because the activities of state and local governments are associated
with market failures, there may be a case for some subsidy of the states by the federal
government. See infra text accompanying notes 379-80. Whether the subsidy should
take the form of a tax incentive that is technically inefficient and disproportionately bene-
fits upper-income taxpayers is doubtful.
349. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
350. See Tax Reform Tax-Exempt Bond Market Thrown Into Disarray Over Changes
to Sen. Packwood's Tax Plan, 54 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-10 to G-11 (March 20,
1986) (proposal of Sen. B. Packwood to subject state and local bond interest to the alter-
native minimum tax).
351. See 2 Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 23-50 (recommended repeal (or restric-
tion) of employer-provided health insurance, group term life insurance, death benefits,
legal services, dependent care services, commuting services, educational assistance, cafe-
teria plans, stock options, employee awards, military allowances, and parsonage
allowances).
352. See President's Proposals, supra note 2, at 24-32, 47-48 (proposed repeal (or re-
striction) of employer-provided health insurance, death benefits, commuting services, and
employee awards).
353. See supra text accompanying notes 248-57.
354. See Bittker, supra note 18, at 743-44 (taxpayer cannot complain of inequity if
taxpayer fails to use available tax preference); Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1259-60.
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reducing the wages of those employees who benefit disproportionately
from the preferences.355 The evidence indicates, however, that certain
taxpayers, notably members of powerful unions and corporate execu-
fives, are able to obtain more extensive fringe-benefit packages than other
taxpayers.356 Although the market probably adjusts somewhat in lower
wages for these packages,357 it is doubtful that the tax benefits are recap-
tured entirely given the fact that unions and corporate executives con-
tinue to opt for the fringe benefits in lieu of higher wages.35
Because of the tax preference, an employee with a choice will opt for
fringe benefits with all other things being equal.359 An employer, too,
will prefer to compensate employees in fringe benefits rather than cash if
the employer can capture part of the tax benefit in a lower overall com-
pensation package. 31 Because both parties have an incentive to adopt
fringe benefit plans, economic distortions result from the diversion of re-
sources to the production of goods and services qualifying for the tax
355. Cf Clotfelter, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Treatment of In-Kind Compensa-
tion, 32 Natl Tax J. 51 (1979) (equity and efficiency analysis of fringe benefits must
consider market compensating mechanisms).
The effect, if any, of the tax preferences for fringe benefits on the wages of benefited
employees is analogous to the effect of the tax-exemption on the price of state and local
government bonds. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
356. See 1 S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation
139 (1972); cf Comment, The Tax Bargain in Executive Compensation, 47 Tex. L. Rev.
405, 405 (1969) (discussing the importance of tax planning by executives and their coun-
sel for executive compensation plans). Of course, if the option of becoming a member of
a powerful union or becoming a corporate executive were equally available to all taxpay-
ers, as it almost certainly is not, this objection to tax preferences for fringe benefits would
be met.
Exclusions for fringe benefits may also be inequitable by discriminating against those
members of labor unions (unmarried members, for example) who would prefer higher
wages to fringe benefits, but who may be outvoted by other union members.
357. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 55-56 (market adjusts, but not completely, for
the tax-exemption for state and local government bonds).
358. It has been argued that definitive conclusions about the inequity caused by tax
preferences for fringe benefits are impossible without "knowledge of individual tastes."
See Clotfelter, supra note 355, at 52. Suppose, for example, that the utility derived by a
recipient of non-taxable fringe benefits is the same as the utility derived by a wage-earner
from after-tax wages in the same pre-tax amount as the value of the fringe benefits.
Under that assumption, there is no tax inequity. See id. at 52-53. But since interpersonal
comparisons of utility are difficult, a rational tax system should assume identical utility
functions, at least across large segments of the population. Cf. Blum & Kalven, supra
note 287, at 461-71 (difficulty of defining utility curve to justify progressive taxation).
There is, for example, no reason to believe that members of powerful unions who benefit
disproportionately from fringe benefits derive less utility from those benefits than nonun-
ion workers. Of course, the tax inequity would disappear if entry into these unions were
free, see Clotfelter, supra note 355, at 52-53, but that is almost certainly not the case. See
supra note 356 and accompanying text.
359. See Adamache & Sloan, Fringe Benefis." To Tax or Not to Tax?, 38 Nat'l Tax J.
47, 48 (1985); Katz & Mankiw, How Should Fringe Benefits be Taxed?, 38 Nat'l Tax J.
37, 38 (1985).
360. See Halperin & Tzur, The Effects of Nontaxable Employee Benefits on Employer
Profits and Employee Work Effort, 38 Nat'l Tax J. 65, 75 (1985); Katz & Mankiw, supra
note 359, at 38.
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exclusion.36 Although taxation of fringe benefits presents difficult
problems of valuation,3 62 Congress should reconsider the reforms in the
taxation of fringe benefits proposed in the original Treasury Report to
the President.363 Judicious changes in the taxation of fringe benefits 364
will improve both the efficiency and equity of the Code and at the same
time raise revenue to support a further reduction in marginal tax rates.365
B. Personal Deductions
1. Charitable Contributions
The deduction for contributions to charities has been criticized on four
grounds. First, to the extent that the deduction works effectively as a tax
incentive, it is skewed to favor the charities of upper-income taxpayers,
who derive a greater tax benefit from contributing the same amount than
taxpayers in lower tax brackets.366 Second, the deduction is technically
inefficient because it bestows a windfall on taxpayers for doing what they
would do even in the absence of a tax incentive.3 67 Third, to the extent
that a charitable contribution provides the donor with tangible or intan-
gible benefits, a deduction for the contribution violates the criterion of
tax equity.36s Fourth, the deduction may distort the allocation of re-
sources in society by favoring the activities of charities over other
activities.369
Whether the deduction in fact distorts resource-allocation depends in
part on its effect, if any, in remedying market failures. My earlier article
noted briefly the possibility that the deduction might operate to cure
market failure under certain circumstances, but concluded that the de-
duction did not appear to have that general effect.3 7 ° Still, a market-
failure defense of the deduction deserves further elaboration in light of
361. See Clotfelter, supra note 355, at 54, 58-59; Halperin & Tzur, supra note 360, at
76; Katz & Mankiw, supra note 359, at 38.
362. See generally Katz & Mankiw, supra note 359 (analysis of the valuation of fringe
benefits from both a theorectical and practical perspective).
363. See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
364. See generally Adamache & Sloan, supra note 359 (discussion from both a theoreti-
cal and practical perspective of the various options for taxing fringe benefits). For pro-
posals for reform, see 2 Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 23-50; R. Goode, supra note 88,
at 119.
365. Marginal tax rates could be lowered if certain fringe benefits were repealed (or
restricted) because the amount of revenue lost by exclusions for various fringe benefits is
quite large. For fiscal year 1987, the revenue drain caused just by the exclusion for em-
ployer-provided health insurance has been projected at $26.4 billion. See Staff of Joint
Comm. on Taxation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for
Fiscal Years 1986-90 18 (Joint Comm. Print 1985).
366. See Andrews, supra note 162, at 310; Surrey, supra note 161, at 720-21; Yorio I,
supra note 4, at 1275-76; supra note 162 and accompanying text.
367. See Surrey, supra note 161, at 719-20; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1276.
368. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1276-77.
369. See id. at 1276.
370. See id. at 1276 n.187.
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Professor Zelinsky's analysis. Many charitable activities generate posi-
tive externalities for which the charity would not be compensated in the
market.37 ' Private schools and universities, for example, produce an ed-
ucated citizenry that redounds to the benefit not just of purchasers of the
school's services, but also of society in general. Other charities (public
television, for example) provide services for which it may be impossible
or extremely difficult to charge every user. 2 To the extent that the
charitable deduction compensates for the market's inability to internalize
positive externalities or to charge free-riders, the effect of the deduction
may actually be to improve overall efficiency.
But even assuming that the incentive provided by the charitable contri-
bution deduction operates to cure certain market failures, the deduction
in its current form may be criticized for bestowing the greatest benefits
on the charities of upper-income taxpayers. Without any evidence that
these charities are faced with more severe problems of market failure
than other charities, a market-failure defense of the current deduction
seems implausible. Moreover, the deduction operates inefficiently by al-
lowing a deduction for an individual's total contributions for the taxable
year, thus granting tax benefits for contributions that would have been
made in the absence of the deduction. 73 To eliminate this technical inef-
ficiency, a statutory provision limiting the tax incentive to marginal con-
tributions would be required, but drafting a provision to accomplish that
objective seems virtually impossible.3 74 Perhaps the most practical solu-
tion, based on the reasonable assumption that a certain amount of chari-
table-giving would occur without a tax incentive, would be to impose a
floor on the deduction (perhaps 2% of adjusted gross income) and to
allow only the amount of contributions for the taxable year in excess of
that floor to be deductible. A statutory floor on the deduction would also
serve as a surrogate, albeit imprecise, for the value of charitable contribu-
tions that benefit the donor-and for that reason are properly nondeduct-
ible-either tangibly in the form of goods or services received by the
donor from the charity or intangibly in the form of the power, prestige,
or psychic satisfaction that flows from private philanthropy. 3 "
2. State and Local Taxes
The deduction for state and local taxes has been criticized on three
grounds. First, the deduction provides the greatest tax benefits to upper-
371. Cf. Andrews, supra note 162, at 357-58 (charities generate "external benefits").
372. Cf id at 370 (people tend not "to pay voluntarily for the provision of public
goods or services up to an optimum level"); R. Posner, supra note 108, at 469 (charitable
deduction "responds to the free-rider problem").
373. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
374. Cf Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1009-10 (difficulty of designing technically efficient
investment incentive).
375. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1276-77.
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income taxpayers. 37 6 Second, the deduction subsidizes high-tax states
and discriminates against low-tax states. 377 Third, the deduction may be
inefficient by skewing resource-allocation to favor state and local govern-
ment activities over other activities or by depriving the federal govern-
ment of greater revenues than state and local governments gain because
of the deduction.378
As with the deduction for charitable contributions, it is at least argua-
ble that the deduction for state and local taxes operates under certain
circumstances as a cure for market failure. 379 Like charitable organiza-
tions, state and local governments provide services, such as education
and welfare, that generate positive externalities for which the market
does not compensate. Then, too, certain government activities, such as
maintaining parks and other recreational facilities, present insoluble free-
rider problems of identifying and charging users for the services pro-
vided. Like the charitable contribution deduction, therefore, the deduc-
tion for state and local taxes may occasionally operate to remedy market
failure rather than to distort resource allocation.
Even assuming that the deduction remedies certain market failures, it
may still be criticized from the standpoint of technical efficiency for cost-
ing the federal government more in lost revenues than state and local
governments gain.38 ° From the perspective of tax equity, the deduction
in its current form is also vulnerable to attack for subsidizing states with
high levels of taxation. Moreover, the positive externalities that may be
generated by state and local governmental activities are presumably cap-
tured, for the most part, by citizens of the political entity engaging in the
activity.381 Thus, to require citizens of other states to subsidize that ac-
tivity is unfair.382
None of these criticisms of the deduction was addressed by the 1986
Act, which repeals only the deduction for state and local sales taxes. 383
Although a distinction between the sales tax and certain other taxes may
be drawn on the ground that the sales tax is levied on transactions that
are usually voluntary,384 the decision to single out the sales tax for repeal
is objectionable on other grounds: it penalizes states that rely heavily on
the sales tax in raising revenue; it skews the tax policy of state and local
376. See President's Proposals, supra note 2, at 62-63; see also Yorio I, supra note 4, at
1277.
377. See President's Proposals, supra note 2, at 62-63; see also Yorio I, supra note 4, at
1277-81.
378. See President's Proposals, supra note 2, at 63-64.
379. See supra notes 370-72 and accompanying text.
380. See President's Proposals, supra note 2, at 63-64.
381. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1278-79. To the extent that an activity of a state and
local government produces "spillover" benefits, the case for the deduction of taxes used
to finance the activity is stronger. See id. at 1279-80; cf. President's Proposals, supra note
2, at 64 (evidence of "spillover" benefits not documented).
382. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1279-81.
383. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
384. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1280-81.
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governments away from a tax that may be preferable, on balance, to
other forms of taxation;3" 5 and it may lead states to engage in "tax plan-
ning" by crafting taxes that formally qualify for deductibility, but resem-
ble in substance a nondeductible sales tax.386
Moreover, repeal of the sales tax deduction does not mitigate the dis-
crimination under the pre-1986 Code against states with low levels of tax-
ation. Although many high tax states use a sales tax to generate revenue,
the sales tax generally represents a larger percentage of the revenues
raised by states with relatively low overall levels of taxation.3 7 Because
repeal of the sales tax deduction not only fails to solve the problem of
subsidization and discrimination among states, but also causes its own
additional problems, reform is necessary in this area.388 The best ap-
proach would be to impose a ceiling (perhaps 5% of adjusted gross in-
come) on the amount of state and local taxes (including sales taxes) that
may be deducted. Placing a cap on the deduction would reduce the sub-
sidy to high-tax states and mitigate the discrimination under current law
against low-tax states and states that rely heavily on the sales tax in rais-
ing revenue. Allowing a deduction for taxes up to the ceiling amount
would recognize that state and local governments support activities that,
despite their worth, might not take place in the market.38 9
3. Mortgage Interest
As discussed in Part I, the federal income tax system contains a conge-
ries of preferences benefiting owner-occupied housing.39°  Prominent
among these incentives, in terms of the drain on federal revenues, 391 is
385. See Sen. Durenberger Releases State/Local Deduction Study, I Tax Documents
(Tax Analysts) No. 9, at 913 (Mar. 3, 1986) (comment of Sen. D. Durenberger that repeal
of sales tax deduction skews tax policy of states).
386. For an example of a proposal to do exactly what I suggest, see N.Y. Times, Dec.
19, 1986, at B3, col. 4 (proposal of New York Assembly Speaker S. Fink to call motor-
vehicle fee and sales tax "personal property tax" to ensure deductibility).
387. In 1985, none of the three states (Alaska, N.Y., Wyo.) with the highest overall
levels of taxation relied on the sales tax for more than 15% of its revenues. Of the seven
states with the lowest levels of taxation (Ala., Ark., Fla., Mo., N.H., Tenn., and Tex.), all
but one (N.H.) used the sales tax to generate more than 20% of their revenues. Three of
these states (Ark., Fla., and Tenn.) relied on the sales tax to raise in excess of 30% of
their revenues. See Gold, How the State Tax Systems Have Been Changing, 31 Tax Notes
287, 288-89 (1986).
388. For a survey of the various reform options open to the federal government, see
Shanahan, Searching for Revenue Raisers: Tapping the State and Local Tax Deduction,
30 Tax Notes 574 (1986).
389. This proposal may be criticized for preserving a technically inefficient subsidy or
for tolerating discrimination against states whose level of taxation is lower than the ceil-
ing. See Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1986, at 34, col. 3 (proposal by economists B. Weinstein and
H. Gross to repeal the deduction). If discrimination against low-tax states is still re-
garded as problematic, the ceiling could of course be lowered. Although the subsidy
provided by the deduction is technically inefficient, adopting a ceiling would probably
reduce the degree of inefficiency.
390. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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the provision of the Code that generally allows a taxpayer to deduct in-
terest incurred on a mortgage on a first or second home.'92 The deduc-
tion has been criticized for creating distortions by skewing resource
allocation towards owner-occupied housing 393 and defended on the
grounds that it operates to remedy imperfections in the housing mar-
ket.394 The analysis in Part I demonstrates, however, that the case for
the deduction as a cure for market failure is weak. 95 Moreover, if the
market does not fully reflect the tax benefits of this incentive, as seems
likely,3 96 the deduction is also a source of tax inequity by favoring owner-
occupants over renters and a source of tax unfairness by bestowing its
greatest benefits on upper-income taxpayers. 97
As with other features of the federal income tax system, it is easy to
identify the problems caused by the mortgage interest deduction, but
harder to devise a practical statutory solution.398 To begin with, it is
necessary to recognize that the difficulties associated with the mortgage
interest deduction derive primarily from the failure of the Code to tax
imputed income. Indeed, if the imputed rental value of owner-occupied
housing were taxable, all the costs of generating that income (including
mortgage interest) would properly be deductible. 99 In a sense, therefore,
the problems associated with the mortgage interest deduction are merely
minor symptoms of the inequity and inefficiency caused by the Code's
general failure to tax imputed income.' °° The most direct method of
eliminating this inequity and inefficiency would be to tax imputed in-
come, as a number of prominent scholars have proposed.4"' But difficul-
ties of valuation and enforcement make it unlikely that Congress will
ever tax imputed income.40 2 Moreover, any reform in this direction,
however sound theoretically, would exact a price in terms of diminished
taxpayer morale and comprehension of the income tax system.40'
392. See I.R.C. § 163(a), (h) (West Spec. Pane. 1987). For a more extensive discussion
of the details of the mortgage interest deduction, see infra text accompanying notes 413-
14.
393. See, e.g., Hendershott, supra note 88, at 1108; Sheppard, supra note 315, at 537
(comment of economist Y. Henderson).
394. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 998-1001, 1007.
395. See supra notes 136-63 and accompanying text.
396. Because taxpayers in marginal tax brackets lower than the 33% tax bracket are in
the market for owner-occupied housing, the market is unlikely to reflect fully the tax
benefits of the mortgage interest deduction. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
398. Cf infra text accompanying notes 432-33 (difficulty of designing equitable and
efficient system for taxing capital assets).
399. See supra note 148.
400. Cf R. Posner, supra note 108, at 465 (deductibility of mortgage interest unobjec-
tionable if imputed income were taxed).
401. See id.; R. Goode, supra note 88, at 120-29.
402. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1274; cf I B. Bittker I, supra note 339, at 1 5.3.2, at
5-25 (taxing imputed income would require taxpayer recordkeeping and serious effort by
the IRS to verify values set by the taxpayers).
403. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1274. Cf 1 B. Bittker I, supra note 339, at 5.3.2, at
5-25 (taxing imputed income "not likely to command much support.., among voters").
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Assuming that imputed income remains exempt, the issue becomes
whether repeal (or restriction) of the mortgage interest deduction would
improve the current system of taxing owner-occupied housing. Because
any significant restriction on the deduction is likely to reduce the flow of
capital investment into owner-occupied housing, the effect in terms of
efficiency will be regarded as positive by those who are convinced that
the deduction distorts the allocation of resources in society.4°4 Repealing
(or restricting) the deduction would also reduce the degree of inequity
between taxpayers who finance the purchase of a home and taxpayers
who rent." 5 On the other hand, taxpayers who purchase their homes for
cash would enjoy an undiminished tax advantage over renters. More-
over, repeal (or restriction) of the mortgage interest deduction would cre-
ate discrimination between taxpayers who must finance the purchase of a
home and taxpayers who are able to purchase a home outright.'
On balance, however, the case for reform of the mortgage interest de-
duction is quite potent. Although some concern for the taxpayer who
must finance the purchase of a home is warranted, it does not seem to
justify retention of a deduction for interest on a mortgage incurred to
purchase a second home. Even with respect to interest on a principal
residence, the degree of one's solicitude for the taxpayer who is required
to finance the purchase is likely to lessen as the amount of interest (and
presumably the value of the home) increases." 8 Thus, the equity argu-
ment for the deduction does not preclude placing a limitation-perhaps
404. See sources cited supra note 393.
405. The inequity under current law between taxpayers who finance the purchase of a
home and taxpayers who rent results from the sum of all the tax preferences provided for
homeownership, including the mortgage interest deduction. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 146-50. Repealing (or restricting) that deduction will lessen the degree of
inequity.
406. Taxpayers who purchase their homes for cash obviously do not obtain a tax ad-
vantage over renters from the mortgage interest deduction itself. But the Code's failure
to tax "net imputed rental income" provides a greater tax advantage to taxpayers who
purchase their homes for cash: their "net imputed rental income" is higher because inter-
est is not incurred to generate the imputed income. See supra note 148 and accompany-
ing text. Repeal (or restriction) of the mortgage interest deduction thus would not
diminish their tax advantage over renters.
407. See 2 B. Bittker I, supra note 339, 31.1.1, at 31-2 to -3. This point may be
illustrated by a simple hypothetical. Assume that X and Y purchase roughly comparable
homes for $100,000 and that each home generates approximately S10,000 of gross im-
puted rental income. X pays cash; Y obtains a $50,000 mortgage at 10% interest to
finance the purchase. Putting aside all other expenses, X has $10,000 of tax-free imputed
income. Although Yalso has $10,000 of tax-free imputed income, he must pay S5,000 in
annual interest to generate that income. Since 7's net imputed rental income is only one-
half of X's, he would be discriminated against relative to X if he were denied all (or part)
of his mortgage interest deduction. The only way of eliminating this discrimination
would be to tax the imputed rental income of both X and Y and to allow a deduction for
all expenses (including interest) incurred in generating that income. See supra text ac-
companying notes 399-401. X would then have $10,000 of taxable imputed income Y
would have $5,000 of taxable income.
408. Cf Hendershott, supra note 88, at 1108 ("persuasive case for subsidizing owners
to occupy larger houses has not been made").
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$10,000--on the amount of interest on a principal residence that may be
deducted during a single taxable year.' Moreover, on the reasonable
assumption that upper-income taxpayers purchase a relatively high per-
centage of second homes and acquire first homes at a higher average
price than other taxpayers, repealing the second-home deduction and
placing a ceiling of $10,000 on the first-home deduction are likely to re-
duce the disproportionate tax benefits that upper-income taxpayers ob-
tain from the deduction in its current form.410
Capping the mortgage interest deduction at $10,000 is also likely to
reduce the flow of capital into owner-occupied housing. However plausi-
ble the case may be for some incentive to homeownership as an offset to
barriers to entry in the housing market or as compensation for positive
externalities, the case for encouraging the purchase of second homes or
of larger and more expensive principal residences seems weak.411 With
respect to barriers to entry in the market, the fact that a taxpayer has
been able to acquire one home weakens the claim that an incentive is
needed to facilitate the purchase of a second home. Moreover, once a
taxpayer has acquired a modest principal residence with the help of an
annual interest deduction of $10,000, the barriers faced by that taxpayer
in financing a larger home in the future are probably minimal. Whatever
the positive externalities generated by homeownership in terms of height-
ened civic responsibility, those benefits are likely to increase insignifi-
cantly, if at all, by the purchase of a second home or of a more expensive
principal residence.4" 2
409. Whatever the ceiling amount on the deduction, it should probably be indexed for
inflation. Cf infra text accompanying notes 434-36 (capital assets should be indexed for
inflation).
410. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62. There is, however, one countervailing
consideration. Restricting the mortgage interest deduction would discriminate against
taxpayers who must finance the purchase of a home relative to taxpayers who are able to
purchase a home outright. See supra note 407 and accompanying text. Because upper-
income taxpayers generally have greater resources at their disposal to purchase a home
outright, they might be the major beneficiaries of this discrimination. On the other hand,
allowing an annual interest deduction of $10,000 would seem to protect most lower- and
middle-income taxpayers against the effects of this discrimination. For the reasons given
in the text, disallowing a deduction for interest above that amount and for interest on
second homes is likely to impact mainly on upper-income taxpayers.
411. See Hendershott, supra note 88, at 1108.
412. If homeownership nurtures civic responsibility and commitment, that would be
true regardless of the size or cost of the home. Encouraging the purchase of a second
home is even less defensible. At best, ownership of a second home will cause the taxpayer
to divide his (or her) quota of a civic commitment between two communities. At worst,
the second home will lead the taxpayer to loosen his (or her) ties to either community.
It is possible, however, that the magnitude of other positive externalities varies directly
with the cost of the home. Professor Zelinsky has pointed out that the "upside-down"
effect of the mortgage interest deduction might be defended on the grounds that expen-
sive homes owned by wealthy taxpayers generate larger spillover benefits for neighboring
property-owners than more modest homes. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1025. See
supra text accompanying notes 183-85. It should be noted, however, that Professor Ze-
linsky is himself uncomfortable with this defense of the mortgage interest deduction. See
Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 1026.
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Finally, the deduction in its current form is a tax planner's delight and
a tax administrator's nightmare. In repealing the general deduction for
personal interest, Congress was apparently concerned that an exception
for mortgage interest on a first or second home would give taxpayers an
incentive to borrow against their homes to finance other consumer
purchases. Thus, Congress generally limited the deduction to interest on
a mortgage up to the tax basis of the homes (adjusted by the cost of
improvements),413 but excepted from this limitation interest on refinanc-
ing proceeds used to pay qualified medical or educational expenses.4 4
Although these rules and exceptions may accommodate the various in-
terests represented in the congressional debates on the interest deduction,
they provide opportunities for planning by taxpayers to derive the maxi-
mum tax advantage from the deduction.4 5 For the IRS, the rules and
exceptions create serious problems in ensuring that the amount of inter-
est deducted does not exceed interest on a mortgage up to the basis of the
homes and in tracing the proceeds of a refinancing above the basis to
ensure that the proceeds were in fact used for medical or educational
purposes.416 Given these difficulties of administration and enforcement, it
seems likely that the deduction in its current form will also prove to be a
source of tax avoidance or evasion that may undermine taxpayer confi-
dence in the income tax system.4 '
If, by contrast, the deduction were subjected to an annual ceiling of
$10,000, the costs generated in tax planning, administration, and enforce-
ment would almost certainly be reduced. Although taxpayers would still
have an incentive to finance consumer purchases by mortgaging their
principal residences, the annual ceiling would place a cap on the tax ben-
efits of the deduction, thereby reducing the transaction costs of tax plan-
ning.41 8 With less revenue at stake419 and with the distinction between
medical and educational and other financings eliminated, the IRS could
limit its inquiry on an audit to whether the interest deducted was in fact
incurred on a mortgage on the taxpayer's principal residence. 420 For rea-
sons both of equity and efficiency, therefore, the case for limiting the
413. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (West Spec. Pam. 1987). If the fair market value
of the home is less than the basis, the taxpayer is only allowed to deduct interest on a
mortgage up to the fair market value. See id § 163(h)(3)(B)(i).
414. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)Cii)(II), (h)(4)(A) (West Spec. Pam. 1987).
415. Taxpayers will be induced, for example, to use home equity loans to finance edu-
cational and medical expenses or to make home improvements. See Wall St. J., Sept. 17,
1986, at 33, col. 4 (proceeds of refinancing may be used to pay off medical or educational
expenses or the cost of home improvements).
416. See id ("Monitoring what is deductible mortgage interest ... will be an added
burden for the Internal Revenue Service.").
417. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
418. Cf Yorio II, supra note 197, at 49 (tax rule is inefficient if it induces "otherwise
unproductive transaction costs" of tax planning).
419. Cf id at 46-47 (tax rule minimizing the stakes in controversy reduces transaction
costs).




interest deduction to $10,000 on a principal residence 421 is persuasive.
C. Capital Gains
My earlier article criticized the deduction for long-term capital gains
in the pre-1986 Code for several reasons: first, it caused inequities be-
tween taxpayers with large amounts of capital gains and other taxpay-
ers;422 second, it skewed the allocation of resources in society by
encouraging investment in assets likely to produce high growth and low
current income;423 and third, it distorted the policy of cQrporations with
respect to the distribution or retention of corporate earnings.424 The arti-
cle noted, however, that outright repeal of the deduction, without other
changes in the taxation of capital assets, would be inequitable, because
bunching a capital gain in one year in a progressive tax system may result
in a higher tax than if the gain had been taxed as it accrued425 and be-
cause a capital gain is unreal to the extent that it merely matches infla-
tion over time.426 Moreover, repeal of the capital gains deduction in
isolation would exacerbate the "lock-in" effect427 caused by two other
features of the federal income tax system-the failure to tax capital ap-
preciation as it accrues and the forgiveness of tax on appreciated prop-
erty held until death.428 Because repeal of the deduction increases the
421. If offsetting barriers to entry in the market is regarded as the primary justification
for the mortgage interest deduction, it might be appropriate to restrict the deduction to
interest incurred on a mortgage to finance the purchase of a principal residence. For
reasons of practicality, however, it seems preferable to allow the deduction for all interest
on a principal residence (up to the ceiling amount), including interest incurred on the
proceeds of refinancing the home. See supra text accompanying notes 413-20.
422. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1284; see also R. Goode, supra note 88, at 194-95 (tax
progressivity and equity affected by concentration of gains in the hands of high income
groups).
423. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1284; see also R. Posner, supra note 108, at 470
(taxpayers "are led to substitute activities that yield capital gains... for equally or more
productive activities that yield ordinary income").
424. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1284; see also R. Posner, supra note 108, at 470
(special treatment of capital gains gives "corporations an incentive to retain rather than
distribute earnings," reducing "the discipline of the capital market"); Sheppard, supra
note 318, at 650 (comment of J. Minarik that repeal of capital gains deduction may in-
duce corporations to distribute earnings).
425. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1284. The point in the text may be illustrated by a
simple hypothetical. Assume that a taxpayer who is normally in the 30% marginal tax
bracket realizes in one taxable year a $100,000 capital gain that accrued over a five-year
period. Because the gain is taxable in one year, the taxpayer is thrust into a higher tax
bracket. If the average rate of tax on the gain is 45%, the effect of a progressive tax
system is to increase the tax on the gain from $30,000 to $45,000.
With the reduction in the number of tax brackets and in the maximum tax rate to 28%,
the untoward effect of bunching a gain in one taxable year in a progressive tax system has
been mitigated under current law. See supra text accompanying notes 215-16.
426. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1284.
427. See B. Bittker, L. Stone & W. Klein, supra note 148, at 806; M. Chirelstein, supra
note 162, 16.01, at 272-73; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1284.
428. See supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
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marginal tax rate on realized gains,4 2 9 taxpayers will have an even greater
incentive to cling to appreciated property for as long as possible.43°
Despite these objections, Congress elected simply to repeal the capital
gains deduction.4 31 Although the resulting system for taxing capital as-
sets is still seriously defective, designing a solution for the remaining in-
equities and inefficiencies will be difficult.4 32 At its best, taxation of
capital assets is likely, as a practical matter, to include a series of uneasy
compromises.43 Nevertheless, Congress should address three defects in
the current system of taxing capital assets that are responsive to feasible
(albeit in two cases partial) tax reform.
First, gains that merely match inflation do not constitute an actual
increase in a taxpayer's ability to pay.434 To rectify the inequity of taxing
illusory gains, the bases of capital assets should be indexed for inflation,
as proposed in the Treasury Report to the President.43 5 Indexing capital
assets for inflation would also alleviate somewhat the lock-in effect of
current rules governing the taxation of capital assets. 36
Second, venture capitalists have complained that the incentive to in-
vest in risky enterprises has been reduced because of the increase in the
marginal tax rate on realized capital gains .43  Although my earlier arti-
429. Under the pre-1986 Code, the maximum marginal tax rate (without regard to the
alternative tax) on long-term capital gains was effectively 20% since the capital gains
deduction was 60% and the highest marginal tax rate was 50%. See I.LC. §§ 1, 1202(a)
(1982) (repealed 1986). Under the 1986 Code, when fully effective, the maximum tax rate
on capital gains will either be 28% or 33%. See supra text accompanying notes 215-16,
234.
430. See R. Goode, supra note 88, at 214; Andrews, supra note 54, at 1134; Yorio I,
supra note 4, at 1284.
431. See supra text accompanying note 234. By reducing the number of tax brackets
and the maximum tax rate, Congress did address and alleviate (albeit indirectly) the
problem in a progressive tax system of bunching a capital gain in one taxable year. See
supra note 425 and accompanying text.
432. See R_ Posner, supra note 108, at 471; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1284-85.
433. See infra text accompanying notes 442-43, 446-49.
434. See R. Posner, supra note 108, at 471-72. Under certain circumstances, the tax
advantage of deferring tax on an unrealized gain may offset the disadvantage of paying a
tax on the portion of the gain that is unreal. See id at 471. But that effect would be
purely serendipitous. In the case of an asset sold at a loss, for example, the failure to
index basis cannot be justified as an offset to the tax advantage of deferral.
435. See 2 Treasury Report, supra note 2, 178-88.
The Treasury Department also proposed that indexing for tax purposes be adopted
more generally. See generally id at 152-72, 177-200 (indexing proposals for depreciation,
capital assets, inventories, and debt). For criticism of the 1986 Act's failure to index
generally for inflation, see Makin & Allison, supra note 130, at 252-53, 259-60; Sheppard,
supra note 315, at 537 ("cadre of economists... lament the ... failure [of the 1986 Act]
to index income from capital for inflation").
436. See 2 Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 186-87; Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1286.
437. See e.g., Sheppard, supra note 318, at 649 (comment of venture capitalist J.
Henry that repeal of the capital gains deduction will reduce incentive to take risks); N.Y.
Times, May 9, 1986, at D5, col. 3 (comments of venture capitalists S. Pratt and S. Rob-
ertson); see also Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1986, at 32, col. 5 (article by economist L Lindsey)
("[Hjligher capital gains rates will discourage entrepreneurship, impede capital formation
and retard economic growth.").
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cle rejected the incentive argument for favorable tax treatment of capital
gains,"' investors in risky ventures can legitimately claim unfairness by
virtue of the limitations placed by the Code on the deductibility of capital
losses.439 Repeal of the capital gains deduction creates a situation in
which the government is effectively a partner, sharing to the extent of the
investor's marginal tax bracket, in any gain realized upon the success of
an investment.' 0 But because of the capital loss limitations, the govern-
ment generally bears a lesser portion of the loss when a venture fails."I
Eliminating this inequity by making capital losses fully deductible
would be too generous to taxpayers and might result in substantial reve-
nue losses because of the ability of taxpayers to realize losses selectively
while deferring realization of gains.442 Still, some liberalization of the
rules governing the deductibility of capital losses-perhaps by increasing
to $10,000 (from $3,000) the maximum amount of capital losses that may
be deducted in a single taxable year-seems proper now that realized
capital gains are fully taxable." 3 Increasing the maximum amount of the
capital loss deduction would also induce certain taxpayers to realize capi-
tal losses, thereby mitigating the "lock-in" effect caused by the current
loss limitations.
Even after indexing the bases of capital assets and liberalizing the
treatment of capital losses, the system of taxing capital assets would re-
main defective by failing to tax unrealized gains (and losses) as they ac-
crue and by exempting unrealized gains (and losses) from tax
consequences upon death. The realization requirement reduces the effi-
ciency and liquidity of the market by inducing taxpayers to cling to ap-
438. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1285; see also Sheppard, supra note 318, at 649
(comment of J. Minarik that incentives for venture capital are self-defeating and distor-
tive if the rate of return on a venture is below the market).
439. See I.R.C. § 1211(b) (West Spec. Pam. 1987) (capital losses deductible by taxpay-
ers other than corporations only to the extent of the lower of $3,000 or "the excess of
such losses over such gains").
440. If, for example, a taxpayer in the 28% marginal tax bracket realizes a gain of
$100,000, the government will levy a tax of $28,000 on the gain.
441. The $3,000 yearly limitation on the deductibility of capital losses may prevent a
taxpayer from being able to deduct the full amount of a capital loss during the taxpayer's
lifetime. At the very least, the annual limitation will defer part of the tax benefit derived
from deducting a substantial capital loss. By contrast, the Code treats as immediate in-
come the full amount of a realized gain. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1982).
Many taxpayers are able to avoid the unfavorable effects of the limitation on the de-
ductibility of capital losses by timing realizations of capital assets to ensure that realized
losses will be offset by realized gains. See id. § 121 1(b)(2) (West Spec. Pam. 1987) (capi-
tal losses deductible to the extent of capital gains). But with respect to taxpayers who are
unable to realize gains commensurate with their realized losses, the capital loss limitation
results in tax inequity.
442. See Sheppard, supra note 318, at 649 (comment of J. Minarik that full deductibil-
ity of capital losses would create "huge revenue losses").
443. Cf id. at 649 (comment of J. Minarik that loosening limitations on capital loss
deduction " 'would clear the decks, giving venture capital an absolute advantage ...
[because of] its high rates of return' ").
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preciated property" and causes tax inequity by favoring taxpayers who
are able to postpone the realization of gains over taxpayers who must
realize gains and taxpayers whose income is comprised of wages or other
immediately taxable receipts." 5
To solve these problems and also eliminate the need for any restric-
tions on the deductibility of capital losses,' s realized gains (and losses)
might be taxed as they accrue. But because of the difficulty of valuing
certain assets on an annual basis and because of possible liquidity
problems," 7 Congress is unlikely to enact a system of accrual taxa-
tion." 8 As a partial solution, Congress should provide that unrealized
gains (and losses) be constructively realized and taxed when capital as-
sets are transferred by gift or bequest." 9 Although adoption of the prin-
ciple of constructive realization would not affect the advantages of
deferral during the taxpayer's ownership of an asset, it would eliminate
the inequity of permanent exemption from tax upon death and would
mitigate the lock-in effect by removing the incentive to hold appreciated
property until death to avoid income tax liability.
CONCLUSION
The case for certain tax preferences on grounds of equity and efficiency
has been forcefully presented in two recent articles on federal income tax
policy. If valid, the arguments adduced in these articles would also sug-
gest that many provisions of the 1986 Act were not mandated by consid-
erations of equity or efficiency. Although the standards set out in these
articles for evaluating federal income tax provisions may have merit in
particular cases, this Article has demonstrated that the 1986 Act gener-
ally improves both the equity and efficiency of the federal income tax by
simultaneously eliminating (or restricting) many tax preferences and by
reducing marginal tax rates. Moreover, with respect to individual in-
come taxpayers, the remaining defects in the Code result mainly from the
failure of Congress to repeal (or limit) other preferences and to use the
revenues thereby generated to reduce marginal tax rates even further.
444. See B. Bittker, L. Stone, & W. Klein, supra note 148, at 806; M. Chirelstein, supra
note 162, at 272-73; R. Posner, supra note 108, at 470; Shakow, supra note 344, at 1114.
445. See Yorio I, supra note 4, at 1284.
446. If capital gains and losses were taxable as they accrue, taxpayers would not be
able to obtain the tax advantage of realizing on loss assets while deferring realization on
gain assets. Thus, the primary reason for restrictions on the deductibility of capital losses
would be eliminated. See supra text accompanying note 442.
447. See R. Posner, supra note 108, at 471 (analysis of valuation and liquidity
problems in taxing unrealized gain); Andrews, supra note 49, at 1143 (taxing unrealized
appreciation might result in forced liquidations); Shakow, supra note 344 at 1113 (twin
problems of valuation and liquidity never previously solved).
448. But see Shakow, supra note 344, at 1118-19 (proposal for modified accrual taxa-
tion of capital assets).
449. See R. Goode, supra note 88, at 220-21; J. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 107-08
(3d ed. 1977).
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